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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation introduces a new metric in the area of High Performance 
Computing (HPC) application reliability and performance modeling. Derived via the 
time-dependent implementation of an existing inequality measure, the Failure index (FI) 
generates a coefficient representing the level of volatility for the failures incurred by an 
application running on a given HPC system in a given time interval. This coefficient 
presents a normalized cross-system representation of the failure volatility of applications 
running on failure-rich HPC platforms. Further, the origin and ramifications of 
application failures are investigated, from which certain mathematical conclusions yield 
greater insight into the behavior of these applications in failure-rich system 
environments. 
This work also includes background information on the problems facing HPC 
applications at the highest scale, the lack of standardized application-specific metrics 
within this arena, and a means of generating such metrics in a low latency manner. A 
case study containing detailed analysis showcasing the benefits of the FI is also included. 
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CHAPTER 1 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND AN INTRODUCTION TO 
HPC RESILIENCE 
1.1 Contributions 
The novel contribution of this work is the introduction of a normalized metric for 
measuring the time-dependent failure volatility of a High Performance Computing 
system. This metric - the Failure Index (FI) - is based on existing inequality measures 
such as the Gini [86], Atkinson [91] and Theil [92] indices and is formulated, 
specifically, as a time-dependent implementation of the Atkinson index. 
The FI generates coefficients based on the downtime resulting from all failures 
incurred by a given system in a given time interval. These coefficients represent the 
differences in downtime resulting from individual system failures in the time interval 
using a 0-to-l system, with FI coefficients closer to 1 representing higher levels of 
volatility amongst failures in the given time interval than FI coefficients closer to 0. This 
volatility is not captured by existing metrics such as Mean Time between Failure 
(MTBF) and system uptime percentage. Figure 1.1 illustrates the information captured 
by the FI relative to these measures. 
1 
2 
impact impact impact impact impact 
10 sec. 10 sec. 10 sec. 40 sec. 10 sec. 
• X X x x x • 
start | || || || | end 
5 m m . 5 m i n . 5 m i n . 5 ra in . 
total runtime total downtime 
30 min. 80 sec. 
Figure 1.1 Information Captured by the Failure Index 
The HPC system represented in Figure 1.1 runs for a total of 30 minutes. Its 
MTBF is 5 minutes. Likewise, the total uptime percentage of this system is 1720 / 1800 
seconds = 0.955 = 95.5%, or "one nine". However, neither metric captures that the 
system exhibits four failures that cause a downtime of 10 seconds each and one failure 
resulting in a downtime of 40 seconds. A Failure Index coefficient would represent this 
inequality. Specifically, given parameter s = 0.20 the FI coefficient for this example 
system is 0.2098798, representing a modest amount of downtime volatility. If each of the 
five failures resulted in a downtime of 10 seconds, the FI coefficient would be 0, 
meaning that every failure's impact on the system was equal. Likewise, in the case that 
four failures resulted in no downtime and a single failure caused all 80 seconds of 
downtime, the resulting FI coefficient would be 1. A mathematical introduction to the 
Failure Index is given in Chapter 4. 
The scale and location-invariant nature of FI coefficients allows us to compare 
the failure volatility of multiple systems regardless of size. This will be demonstrated in 
Chapter 5 when constructing FI coefficients for 23 different machines housed at Los 
Alamos National Laboratory, all of which contain different numbers of compute nodes. 
3 
The FI coefficient is a unitless value. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, many 
existing system reliability metrics are not standardized across the entire HPC arena, 
which allows for manipulation and corruption of system performance metrics. However, 
the unitless nature of the FI prevents this, as, given an assumption of globally defined 
failure events, FI coefficients represent similar levels of volatility across multiple 
machines. This allows for a true comparison of system failure volatility using a 
normalized scheme and should find a home as a quality of service measure for HPC 
system performance and resilience. 
1.2 An Overview of the Dissertation 
Chapter 1 first summarizes the novel contributions of this work. It then provides 
an overview of the dissertation and an introduction to the resilience issues facing today's 
large scale HPC machines and applications. It covers a general introduction to the field 
of resilience and its importance in today's HPC arena, a look specifically at the issues 
facing applications computing on the world's fastest machines, and a review of existing 
approaches for combating such problems. Further, the current lack of application-specific 
metrics in the HPC research and development community is examined. This includes 
discussion on the lack of information stemming from large-scale systems as well as the 
need for standardization in HPC measures and definitions across the landscape, including 
government, academic and industrial entities. This chapter also represents the motivation 
for the work outlined in subsequent chapters in this dissertation. 
Chapter 2 introduces a module for generating relevant resilience-specific 
information from a given HPC application. This application, Gilgamesh [83], was 
developed by the author as a means for combating the application information gap 
4 
discussed in Chapter 1. An existing HPC dataset is then examined using traditional 
statistics. 
Chapter 3 begins the discussion of inequality indexing by demonstrating that such 
approaches are both possible and practical when applied in an HPC context. The Gini, 
Atkinson, and Theil indices are mathematically introduced and Gini and Atkinson 
coefficients are generated using an existing HPC performance dataset containing 
reliability information from multiple machines. Results are then discussed and 
conclusions pertinent to the use of such indices in examining HPC application behavior 
are drawn. 
Chapter 4 introduces the Failure Index (FI) from a theoretical standpoint, 
including its definition and mathematical construction. This chapter contains the bulk of 
the novel work undertaken in the research and as such it should be read carefully. 
Lastly, Chapter 5 demonstrates the utility of the FI by conducting a case study 
consisting of multiple models and analysis. In this analysis FI coefficients are generated 
in conjunction with the same HPC performance dataset utilized in Chapter 3. The scale-
and location-invariant nature of the metric allows us to obtain novel results related to all 
machines contained in the dataset. 
Chapter 6 contains conclusions drawn from the entirety of the work as well as 
proposed future studies in resilience, HPC applications and metric generation. 
1.3 The Current State of HPC Resilience 
High-end parallel computing is relying increasingly on large clusters with 
thousands or even tens of thousands of processors. Further, many of today's large scale 
systems such as the Road Runner machine at Los Alamos National Laboratory include 
5 
heterogeneous architectures, increasing the complexity of such machines even further. 
With so many nodes and with such complicated architectures, system and application 
failures are becoming increasingly commonplace on these machines. 
As an example, one of today's fastest systems - the BlueGene/L (BG/L) machine 
housed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), which contains 65,536 
compute nodes and 131,072 cores - was failing once nearly every 48 hours during its 
initial deployment in 2005 [1]. Each time one of those nodes failed, a 1024-processor 
midplane had to be temporarily shut down in order to replace a dual-processor compute 
card. This is clearly unacceptable from a quality of service standpoint, especially 
considering that each of these machines costs millions (or in the case of the afore-
mentioned Road Runner, hundreds of millions) of dollars. Table 1.1 illustrates that the 
existing reliability of larger HPC clusters is currently constrained by a mean time 
between failures (MTBF) in the range of 1.2 - 351 hours depending on the age of the 
machine. 
Table 1.1 Publicly Available HPC System Reliability Statistics 
Installed 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2002 
2003 
2006 
System 
ASCI White 
PSC Lemieux 
NERSC Seaborg 
ASCIQ 
Google 
Blue/Gene L 
Processors 
8,192 
3,016 
6,656 
8,192 
15,000 
131,072 
MTBF 
40.0 hours 
9.7 hours 
351.0 hours 
6.5 hours 
1.2 hours 
47.8 hours 
Measured 
2002 
2004 
2007 
2002 
2004 
2006 
Source 
[2] 
[3] 
[4] 
[5] 
[6] 
[7] 
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Existing work [2] similarly suggests a system mean-time to failure (SMTTF) 
constraint of 5-6 hours, or 4 failures per day, for current HPC systems. The most 
common causes of failure were processor, memory and storage errors. Extrapolating 
from current system performance levels, a study by Los Alamos National Laboratory 
(LANL) estimates a MTBF of 1.25 hours for a petaflop machine [3]. Commercial 
installations such as Google experience an interpolated MTBF of just over one hour for 
an equivalent number of nodes (see Table 1.1) as the BG/L system. However, Google's 
fault-tolerant middleware hides such failures, leaving user services completely intact [4]. 
It must be noted that parallel applications still maintain reduced completion times 
in comparison to their single threaded counterparts. However, when substantially 
increasing the number of nodes located within an HPC system and assuming theoretical 
linear scalability for applications, application completion times do not necessarily 
decrease proportionally. In fact, based on results obtained in [6], the opposite is true -
while application completion time initially decreases as more nodes share the work, at 
some critical point this value begins to rise substantially due to the increased likelihood 
of reliability issues stemming from addition of computational units. Figure 1.2 illustrates 
this. 
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Figure 1.2 Application Completion Time vs. Number of Nodes 
Recent accomplishments in providing an insight into HPC resilience showed that 
some HPC system failures can be anticipated by detecting deteriorating system health 
through hardware monitoring [5]. Further recent work focused on capturing the 
availability of large-scale systems using combinatorial and Markov models and 
subsequently comparing these results with statistics from large-scale U.S. Department of 
Energy (DOE) installations [6, 7]. 
However, the health data collection and processing algorithms outlined in these 
studies do not efficiently perform on large-scale HPC systems. Furthermore, fair and 
meaningful reliability comparisons between systems are impossible due to different 
hardware and software architectures, failure modes, and system health and failure 
reporting mechanisms. Others have suggested [6] that reliability and availability metrics 
standard for HPC were needed, as well as scalable, non-intrusive system health data 
collection and processing algorithms. Both of these topics are discussed at length in the 
body of this dissertation. 
8 
To prevent lost computation time due to failure, checkpoint/restart (C/R) 
algorithms have become a requirement for most long-running HPC jobs. Current C/R 
mechanisms commonly allow checkpoints to be written to a global file system. This 
allows an entire MPI (Message Passing Interface) job to be restarted from its last 
checkpoint in the event of failure. One example of such a solution is LAM (Local Area 
Multicomputer)/MPI's [8] C/R support through Berkeley Labs C/R (BLCR) [9]. 
C/R, like many other existing techniques, is a reactive scheme. Such techniques 
allow a computation to recover once a failure has occurred. The Los Alamos study 
leveraged these techniques to estimate the checkpoint overhead requirements of a 
petaflop machine. It found that based on current techniques, a 100 hour, failure-free job 
will be prolonged by an additional 151 hours in petaflop systems. 
Some recent studies suggest collecting data from existing machines and using 
that information in a reactive manner to derive a checkpoint interval that trades off 
checkpoint cost against restart cost [10]. Instead of a reactive scheme for fault tolerance, 
others are promoting a proactive approach that migrates processes away from unhealthy 
nodes and onto healthy ones. Such an algorithm has the advantage that checkpoint 
frequencies can be reduced as sudden, unexpected faults should become less common 
[11]. 
Further still, failure prediction has become a relevant and highly researched topic 
due to the substantial growth in size and scope of HPC deployments and the 
corresponding increase in system failure rate [12]. Predicting and proactively treating 
failures via the use of appropriate resilience mechanisms such as the ones previously 
mentioned substantially reduces the amount of wasteful re-computation time required in 
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the triage period following a failure. However, most contemporary failure prediction 
techniques involve MTTF approximation and post-event analysis of system logs [13, 14]. 
Others suggest a need for analysis based on individual compute node reliability in 
conjunction with system health [15]. 
The feasibility of health monitoring at various levels has recently been 
demonstrated for temperature-aware monitoring via the utilization of ACPI [16] and 
more generically by critical-event prediction [17]. Such approaches in systems with 
thousands of processors such as BG/L range from application runtime-level techniques to 
the level of operating system (OS) schedulers [18]. 
While process-level C/R has received much attention in the HPC arena, recent 
results on OS-level C/R show that OS virtualization is a viable alternative. More 
specifically, experiments were conducted with process-level BLCR [19] and Xen [20] to 
assess the overhead of saving and restoring the image of an MPI application on a faulty 
node. For BLCR this comprises the process of an MPI task, while for Xen the entire 
guest OS is saved. Tests for NAS PB programs under Class C inputs show an overhead 
of 8-10 seconds per one-minute run of BLCR and 15-23 seconds per one-minute run of 
Xen on the same experimental platform [21]. Variations are mostly due to the memory 
requirements of specific benchmarks. These memory requirements also dominate those 
of the underlying OS, which explains why Xen remains competitive in these 
experiments. 
1.4 Preliminary Studies and Related Work 
Detailed analysis was performed on system event records generated by the four 
Advanced Scientific Computing (ASC) machines (White, Frost, Ice, and Snow) housed 
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at LLNL [2]. Using Markov modeling, time to failure (TTF) data for the 512-nodes ASC 
White machine covering a four-year operational period [22] was generated. The average 
per-node SMTTF was found to be approximately 3293 hours, or around four months. 
This failure information was then taken and compared to a variety of statistical 
distributions, using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test to obtain the most appropriate 
fit. The K-S test yields a best fit between the empirical data and four theoretical 
distributions - namely the exponential, Weibull, Gamma and Log-normal distributions. 
K-S testing was performed on 512 different nodes and time period permutations 
assimilated from the ASC White logs. The data suggested that the failure rate varies over 
time. It was found that, as such, Weibull, Gamma, and Log-normal distributions, all of 
which suggest variable response in conjunction with time change, provide a more 
accurate basis for reliability modeling than an exponential distribution, which implies 
constant failure behavior, as shown in Table 1.2. 
Table 1.2 Best Fit Cases, ASC White 
Distribution 
Exponential 
Weibull 
Gamma 
Log-normal 
Number of Best Fit Cases 
185 
334 
328 
318 
In a separate investigation on raw LLNL Blue Gene/L system logs, the XCR 
team at Louisiana Tech University [23] found that both hardware and software failures 
could not be easily obtained from the log file. The team also introduced a novel approach 
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for deriving software interrupts from raw system failures using the system time to repair 
(TTR). It was suggested that this data be used for higher-level knowledge discovery such 
as reliability analysis or failure prediction. 
Additionally, the XCR team presented optimistic and pessimistic approaches for 
estimating a system's failure behavior, representing best-case and worst-case behaviors 
respectively. Results showed that the failure behavior bounds - both best-case and worst-
case - vary greatly due to a multitude of undetermined events that are flagged as fatal 
system failures. Problems arose in attempting to determine if such events were truly fatal 
behaviors or false positives. This problem confirmed the importance of failure 
identification mechanisms such as system monitoring and logging. 
We have also developed a reliability-aware resource allocation model for parallel 
programs [24] and an optimal checkpoint/restart model [25]. The reliability-aware 
resource allocation model aims to minimize performance loss due to failure. Results 
indicate that applying a reliability-aware resource allocation technique reduces the 
overall waste time of parallel jobs by as much as 30%. The improved checkpoint model 
optimizes wasted time (checkpoint overhead, recovery time, and re-computational time) 
by balancing both checkpoint overhead and re-computational time. 
In addition, a fault tolerance framework [26] was developed that enables an HPC 
system to self-heal/self-clone in order to tolerate a system failure by using 
checkpoint/restart mechanisms. This framework was implemented on Linux-based HPC 
systems and integrated an optimal checkpoint placement model. This model was further 
extended to act as a feedback control loop - a fundamental part of the resilience 
framework. 
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Additionally, the author assisted in the formation of a Resilience Consortium 
consisting of top researchers in the field of HPC resilience. Stated goals include the 
standardization of terms, methods, and algorithms encountered in resilience research and 
the development of fault tolerant large-scale computing systems. This consortium is an 
open community of HPC leaders from industry, academia, and research institutions. 
Preliminary studies concluded that better data acquisition coupled with improved 
reliability and prediction models as well as continued enhancement to the feedback 
control loop will lead to an improved resilience model that increases application 
productivity. 
As in this dissertation, most contemporary studies which conduct reliability 
analysis on large-scale computing systems assume that failures transpiring within various 
components or nodes are independent [27-29]. However, other studies exist suggesting 
some inter-constituent dependencies in failure origin, especially at the application level 
[30]. Dependencies reported by these studies occur mostly in system configuration and 
within the operation environment [31]. Such dependencies are not accounted for in this 
work. 
To improve reliability model accuracy, a relaxation in the assumption of 
independent failure behavior was suggested, as the model should represent the failure 
probability of each node as well as of the cross-application runtime environment. 
Another important discovery derived from reliability analysis of HPC systems is that for 
a given parallel architecture and problem size, application completion time will not 
continuously decrease due to a constant introduction of new processors and higher core 
counts into the computing system. Such results rest at the heart of the resilience issues 
13 
facing large-scale HPC, as it is that victim-of-scale phenomenon that is most often 
studied. Various aspects of scalability were examined in [32, 33]. 
In application distribution, Shatz et al. [34] modeled tasks and communication 
links as a directed graph, using it to intelligently allocate jobs within heterogeneous 
distributed systems. Other groups studied application allocation through checkpointing 
mechanisms [35]. There are also existing works which propose checkpoint scheduling 
optimization [36, 37]. Geist et al. [38] and Wong et al. [39] presented Markov 
availability models and obtained an optimal checkpoint placement that maximizes 
system availability. Ling et al. [40] presented optimal checkpoint scheduling models for 
an infinite horizon time by using a calculus of variations technique. They concluded that, 
theoretically, a fixed checkpoint interval is optimal if and only if application failure 
follows a Poisson distribution. Ozaki et al. [41] extended the calculus of variations 
concept introduced in [42] to apply to a system with a finite horizon time and incomplete 
failure information. However, both works define re-computation time as a linear function 
demonstrating model applicability - a metric that in practice should depend upon failure 
behavior. 
Plank et al. [43] discussed the importance of processor count as a performance 
attribute in checkpointing applications. The now-popular concept of incremental 
checkpointing was introduced as a means of reducing checkpoint/restart mechanism 
overhead by saving the state of only those application pages that have been changed [44-
46]. Palaniswamy et al. [47] observed that, given a minimal number of increments, the 
incremental checkpointing approach has the potential to surpass traditional 
checkpointing algorithms in efficiently utilizing computational resources. The challenge 
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in achieving minimum overhead while using incremental checkpointing schemes is to 
find a maximum number of incremental checkpoints while maintaining lower system 
costs than traditional algorithms. 
In addition to the utilization of checkpointing mechanisms, some researchers also 
studied the costs and benefits associated with job migration. Halchor-Balter and Downy 
[48] used process aging to present a migration cost model. They concluded that process 
migration most benefits those processes which exhibit long execution times. Mello and 
Senger [49] proposed a model which evaluates process load and lifetime in order to 
analyze the effects of job migration within an environment composed of heterogeneous 
computers. That study assumes that the load balancing frequency of each compute node 
indicates the occupation level of that node. The proposed model then makes a decision 
regarding which application processes should be migrated. 
Other groups proposed algorithms which combine checkpoint/restart mechanisms 
and process migration. For example, Cao et al. [50] presented a process migration 
strategy based on the coordinated checkpointing of message passing interface (MPI) 
applications. 
This technique modifies process location-related information in the checkpoint 
file and reintroduces the application with respect to the modified location. Sun et al. [51] 
proposed the Fault-aware ENabled Computing Environment (FENCE) system for high 
end computing - a unified computing framework with both reactive and proactive 
mechanisms. As in this dissertation, most existing optimal scheduling frameworks [52-
54] assume that system failure follows a Poisson distribution. However, many also 
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assume a constant failure rate, which in most cases is not a good representation of actual 
system failure characteristics [55, 56]. 
In HPC failure prediction research, Xue et al. [57] surveyed five major prediction 
techniques - a statistic-based threshold method, time series analysis, rule-based 
classification, Bayesian network models and semi-Markov process models. The survey 
concluded that Bayesian network models and semi-Markov process models are the best 
approximations of system failure due to precision and recall. This conclusion led to the 
utilization of naive Bayesian classification in the construction of the FI. 
Semi-Markov processes were used in [58] to model the system reliability of 
computational grids, and then further used in forming the probability of failure for an 
individual system within in the grid. By filtering out periodic failures, the relative error 
of predicting system reliability in relation to empirical reliability is relatively small (less 
than 0.05). However, this reliability metric directly infers only the probability of failure, 
rather than actually predicting system failure. 
Lead time ( |7\ | ) is defined as the interval between the time a failure prediction 
takes place and the time that predicted failure is expected to occur. The predicted failure 
interval is similarly denoted \TP\. Salfner et al. presented a failure prediction method 
called Similar Event Prediction (SEP) [61], which exploited a semi-Markov model by 
using groups of events to form states and predicting a failure if the probability of failure 
obtained from the model exceeded a predefined threshold. The model predicted failures 
with a bounds of |7 \ | = \TP\ = 1 minute and yielded results illustrating high precision 
(0.8) and recall (0.923). Precision and recall are measures of accuracy defined in relation 
to true or false positive or negative resulting values, with values closer to 1 indicating 
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more accurate results than values closer to 0. Precision (formula 1.1) and recall (1.2) are 
mathematically defined below: 
true positive 
Precision = — — (1-1) 
true positive + false positive 
true positive 
Recall = —— . (1.2) 
true positive + false negative 
This analysis was performed on legacy telecommunication deployments varying 
greatly in design and purpose from high-end HPC systems. Further, the assumed one 
minute lead time may be too short to allow the system to take adequate responsive 
action. 
In addition to Markov models, association rule discovery [59] has also been 
applied to HPC failure prediction. The researchers form sets by grouping events that 
appear close to each other chronologically and apply an association rule discovery 
algorithm, predicting failures using a set of rules inferring either critical or fatal events. 
Sahoo et al. [60] applied this approach utilizing a variable time interval, from 100 to 800 
seconds. They claimed that the resulting model provided up to 70% accuracy in 
predicting failures. Gujrati et al. [61] similarly applied this technique using a varying 
\TP\ - from 5 minutes to 1 hour - and \Tt\ = 0. However, because |7\ | = 0, an 
implementation of this model is unobtainable. Additionally, meta-learning applied in 
[62] can help boost recall from 0.22-0.55 up to more than 0.65. 
Bayesian network models have not been explored to their full potential in HPC 
resilience study. This is due to the high computational costs of network topology 
construction and structural learning. As in this dissertation, Hamerly and Elkan [63] 
exploited a nai've Bayes scheme: a Bayesian methodology which assumes independence 
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among variables - to predict disk drive failures, achieving a 0.33 true positive rate and a 
0.0067 false positive rate. Causality of variables can also be studied with Bayesian 
analysis [64]. Sahoo [65] used Bayesian analysis to study causes and effects amongst 
system variables, such as CPU usage and occurrence of system events. 
Analyzing system failure behavior is not a trivial matter, and as such, a variety of 
statistical methods must be exploited in the development of a reliability-aware runtime 
framework for the modeling of large-scale systems, specifically in analyzing the 
behavior of large-scale HPC applications. Bayesian analysis serves as a good alternative 
to conventional statistical analysis methods in that it allows researchers to use all 
available current and prior information in creating statistical models, as opposed to 
conventional methods which restrict analysis to current data. The Bayesian approach 
models parameters as random quantities and uses existing information to construct an 
antecedent distribution model for the values. 
There is little to no existing work in the utilization of inequality indices in 
modeling HPC application behavior, let alone the development of a new index 
specifically targeted at creating such models. 
1.5 A Lack of Standardization Amongst Metrics 
When one examines existing work in the areas of performance and reliability 
analysis, behavioral modeling, quality of service estimation and failure prediction, it 
becomes immediately clear that there exists substantial need for standardization in both 
the explicit definitions and mathematical derivations utilized in such studies. Concepts 
such as an application's MTBF, checkpoint/restart latency or overhead, failure prediction 
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costs or application process migration overhead are defined in radically different ways 
depending on the individuals or organizations performing the analysis in question. 
One such example is the definition of failure itself. While on its surface a very 
simple idea requiring what should be an analogously simple definition, failure is instead 
defined in radically variant ways across the HPC resilience community. Entities focusing 
strictly on HPC systems, for example, define failure strictly as a system-centric construct 
- that is, power or network outages are labeled as failures, while the unexpected 
termination of one or more applications running on those systems are not labeled as such. 
Examples of such entities are telecommunication data centers and large storage facilities. 
However, more application-focused individuals or organizations would certainly 
consider unexpected job termination a failure. Included in this group are pure scientists, 
government laboratories, or any entity utilizing its HPC assets for capability computing. 
Even at this level - which, it should be noted, is the point of view taken in this 
dissertation - there exists much debate on the specific details included in the definition 
of application failure. Certainly it would be considered a failure if one submits a job and 
it terminates before reaching its expected outcome. However, what if only one 
application process terminates unexpectedly, while the remainder successfully finish? 
What if the application enters an infinite loop? In this case the application certainly 
hasn't terminated, yet it will never finish executing. 
There is no existing, widely adopted answer to any of these questions. The 
Resilience Consortium has begun the process of tackling issues such as standardization, 
but no industry-wide consensus has been reached and there remains much work to be 
done in defining even the simplest of terms. All entities performing high performance 
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computing are aware of the issue and acknowledge the utility of arena-wide metric 
standardization, but all bring their own biases in regard to such terms and little progress 
has been made in this area. 
This lack of standardization along with a strong need for application-specific 
reliability metrics spawned the work outlined in this dissertation. The latter issue is 
covered explicitly in the following chapter, while the entirety of this work is devoted to 
providing one solution for the former. Although one-hundred percent adoption of these 
concepts is an unrealistic goal, it is hoped that industry leaders and specifically the 
Resilience Consortium give this idea of a unified Failure Index for HPC application 
volatility a strong look and seriously consider pressing for the adoption of such a metric. 
Even ignoring its utility as a location- and scale-invariant measure of application 
volatility (those concepts will be discussed in depth in Chapters 3 through 5) the FI as 
proposed in this dissertation can be easily implemented on live HPC systems, making it a 
lightweight solution. 
CHAPTER 2 
HPC METRICS: GENERATION AND EXAMINATION 
2.1 Generating Metrics for HPC Applications 
The HPC community is presently encountering substantial proliferation in the 
number of computational units used in its computing platforms. Although this increase in 
size (and, subsequently, computing power) has both raised the bar for what high 
performance machines can do and brought mainstream attention to the field via its 
ascension beyond the petaflop barrier, it has also led to an increase in application 
downtime [66]. 
Traditionally, the HPC research community has attempted to alleviate such issues 
via the research and development of solutions geared toward increasing the reliability of 
these machines. These hardware-centric solutions carry a single objective: maximize the 
system uptime of a given HPC distribution. However, as extreme-scale HPC platforms 
enter the petaflop age via the dissemination of ten and hundred-thousand core 
architectures, application failures are encountered at rates that pragmatically prevent 
fully reliable systems [67]. Thus, there is much work to be done in providing HPC 
applications with the ability to run through failure. That is, solutions must be devised 
that endow these programs with the capability to be resilient to failures encountered by 
the systems upon which they execute. 
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We define a fully resilient HPC application as one that continues an acceptable level 
of execution in the event of any variant form of non-catastrophic failure encountered by 
its host system (catastrophic failures being wholly unavoidable events such as natural 
disasters and center-wide power outages). Resilience, then, is a metric denoting how 
close a given HPC application comes to realizing full resilience. This measure will, in 
time, become as important in measuring the 'worth' of a given HPC platform as 
contemporary benchmarks such as peak FLOPS, due to the increasing power and cost 
demands of computing at an extreme scale. 
The question, then, becomes "how does one provision HPC applications with 
resilience-focused capabilities?" The answer begins with investigating how and why 
contemporary extreme-scale machines are encountering such a startling number of 
performance interruptions. This, however, is no simple task, due to the severe lack of 
existing public information originating from high-end HPC applications. Los Alamos 
National Laboratory collected and published data regarding the failure and usage of more 
than 20 of their supercomputing clusters [68] and this information has been analyzed by 
Schroeder et. al. from CMU in an attempt to study the root cause of the reported failures 
[69]. This data consists primarily of failure data and system administrator notes but does 
not include machine logs. This dataset will be examined in the following chapter. 
As outlined in the previous chapter, work undergone by others within the HPC 
research community has concluded that the inherent lack of structure exhibited by 
supercomputer system log files prevents the ability to perform efficient analysis on the 
reliability of such machines. Thus, to further resilience-centric study, there exists the 
need for a novel method of extracting performance and reliability data directly from 
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extreme-scale applications. This chapter outlines a solution that, via a combination of 
dynamic instrumentation and autonomous application correction, provides and handles 
this information in an efficient manner. 
Resilience, as a research and development field, can be defined as the radically 
application-centric study of HPC reliability. Recapping from the previous chapter, those 
within this field began preliminary investigations into the Mean Time to Interrupt 
(MTTI) exhibited by contemporary high-end HPC applications. A LANL study [70] 
extrapolated current system performance and subsequently estimated a 1.25 hour 
application MTTI for a petaflop system - a very alarming and unacceptable value 
especially given the time required to take a full-system memory snapshot (checkpoint). 
This investigation concludes by suggesting that novel applications aimed at extending 
the functional inter-failure lifespan of HPC applications be devised. 
In many of these studies, the authors encounter tremendous difficulty in 
extracting relevant and legible reliability information from extreme-scale application log 
files [71]. Most concluded that the labyrinthine nature and enormous size of these 
documents greatly hinders both the speed with which one can perform root cause 
analysis and the efficient real-time monitoring and modeling of application performance. 
Sisyphus [72], a web-based log file analysis tool developed at Sandia National 
Laboratory, aims to resolve this conflict by filtering such log files via latent-semantic 
indexing. This process utilizes a network of regular expression algorithms to parse and 
display relevant information located within the log. 
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The health data collection processes outlined in existing studies, however, are 
both reactive and substantially system-centric. Furthermore, these approaches do not 
efficiently scale when large numbers of nodes are added to an HPC system. 
As such, an efficient solution for the real-time generation of reliability metrics 
from highly-scaled HPC applications must be designed and implemented to facilitate 
further study in the resilience field. Further, these metrics should be handled 
autonomously, allowing the application to self-correct resilience issues without live 
human interaction. These goals, then, are the focus of the work described in this chapter. 
Here Gilgamesh is presented, developed by the author as a plug-in for the 
Open|SpeedShop performance analysis suite. Gilgamesh utilizes the dynamic 
instrumentation of binary source to efficiently collect program information for jobs run 
on extreme-scale HPC distributions. It then uses a scripting and database interface to 
handle the generated information and autonomously provision application reliability. 
Open|SpeedShop (OSS) is an open source performance monitoring tool funded 
by the U.S. Department of Energy Tri-Labs at Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratories. OSS was initially developed by Silicon Graphics, Inc. 
(SGI) and later adopted as a community effort by the Krell Institute. Per its website, OSS 
is "an open source multi platform Linux performance tool which is initially targeted to 
support performance analysis of applications running on both single node and large scale 
IA64, I A3 2, EM64T, and AMD64 platforms. It is explicitly designed with usability in 
mind and targets both application and computer scientists" [73]. 
Open|SpeedShop contains four different user interfaces: graphical, command line, 
Python scripting, and batch. The graphical user interface (GUI) provides real-time visual 
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representation of system and application performance. Likewise, the command line 
interface (CLI) enables a less costly method for quickly and easily viewing performance 
information. Lastly, the batch interface (utilized by Gilgamesh) serves as a means for 
external scripts and applications to call upon OSS to perform a specified function. Figure 
2.1 showcases the Open|SpeedShop GUI in action - in this case, displaying program 
counter sampling information. 
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OSS also supports the development of user-created plug-ins (called 'experiments' 
in the OSS lexicon) which allow one to leverage the software's mechanics to capture 
user-defined metrics from the target application. There are a number of application 
properties that OSS can extract and analyze without any modification or addition to its 
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source. Among these are the following: floating point exceptions, hardware counter data, 
input/output information, MPI tracing, program counter sampling, and user time metric 
collection [74], most of which cannot be found in system log files. The Open|SpeedShop 
portion of Gilgamesh cherry picks collectors for resilience-pertinent information and 
establishes an interface through which the external storage and correction processes can 
access this data in real-time. 
Prior research within the HPC resilience research community has concluded that 
there exists a need for the development of software which provides extreme-scale HPC 
applications with the ability to successfully continue computation in the event of non-
catastrophic performance interruptions [75, 76]. The logical first step in this software's 
development cycle, then, is the creation of a module by which resilience-pertinent 
information is extracted from an HPC application. That is, in order to successfully 
provision fully resilient high performance programs, one must first gather the 
information to determine how and why the application is failing. 
Gilgamesh leverages Open|SpeedShop to accomplish this via the dynamic 
instrumentation packages located within the OSS framework. Developed as an OSS 
plug-in, this portion of Gilgamesh utilizes the DPCL [77] and Dynlnst [78] packages that 
drive OSS's dynamic instrumentation capabilities to quickly generate resilience-pertinent 
metrics from running HPC applications. As the application executes, user-determined 
function calls trigger Dynlnst and DPCL to comb the program's source and generate a 
snapshot of its current state, dynamically instrumenting the application. These 
parameters are then collected by Gilgamesh's scripting framework and stored in an SQL 
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database, where the autonomous correction module analyzes the data and resolves 
reliability-threatening issues before they impact application execution. 
By default Gilgamesh is configured to capture specific metrics from a user 
application. This initial set of metrics constitutes a general class of parameters that are 
often useful to a wide range of applications, but, through the Gilgamesh graphical user 
interface, the user can define others. 
Gilgamesh utilizes Open|SpeedShop's batch interface to intelligently attach its 
data generation module to the job queuing and execution processes without being 
explicitly launched from within a given user space. When a user submits a job to the 
batch scheduler, Gilgamesh recognizes this and prepares to attach itself to the application 
once it is scheduled and begins to execute. The interaction between Open|SpeedShop and 
Gilgamesh is displayed in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2 Interaction between Open|SpeedShop and Gilgamesh 
As a plug-in for Open|SpeedShop, Gilgamesh's data collection module works by 
executing revised copies of the runtime.c (application-side) and collector.cxx (OSS-side) 
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source files that initialize the various dynamic instrumentation processes. These files, 
then, work together to generate Binary Large Objects (blobs), which contain the actual 
information extracted from the application. The rate at which Gilgamesh produces blobs 
may be explicitly determined by the user via the Open|SpeedShop GUI. This dissertation 
will focus more on the data generation and storage aspects of Gilgamesh, as its analysis 
and correction routines have since been replaced by the failure indexing algorithm 
introduced in Chapter 4 and used in Chapter 5. 
Gilgamesh contains a script which brokers storage of the reliability information 
captured by OSS. Launched in conjunction with the data collection processes as the 
target application leaves the queue, this script periodically enters OSS's batch interface 
and dumps the generated metrics into a SQL database which exists completely outside of 
the OSS realm. This greatly expands its flexibility - one could connect any number of 
additional applications to this database and, so long as it remains formatted in the 
Gilgamesh schema, the metric generation and storage processes will execute seamlessly. 
The rate at which this script interacts with OSS can be easily modified by editing an 
associated configuration file. 
As application reliability information is stored, Gilgamesh then evaluates the 
data, determines if there exist any potential problems, and attempts to preemptively 
correct these issues via a number of available techniques. Once the storage script has 
completed execution, it instantiates a correction script that accesses the SQL database 
and statistically analyses the data captured by Open|SpeedShop. It is important to note 
that these scripts exist completely outside of the OSS framework - any database 
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containing application reliability information can be analyzed by this correction module, 
so long as it is a SQL database with the Gilgamesh schema. 
Unlike most contemporary approaches, the health determination algorithm used 
by Gilgamesh does not utilize a threshold-crossing algorithm. Instead, Gilgamesh 
determines if the application is trending towards failure. That is, instead of comparing 
the application information in the database to a collection of associated values and 
determining if the value exceeds the listed threshold, Gilgamesh's failure anticipation 
algorithm works by comparing all values of a given metric and the associated times at 
which these values were generated by the application. It then analyses the slope of this 
comparison and signals if the given attribute is trending towards a potential failure. This 
idea of an anticipation algorithm played a big role in the eventual creation of the Failure 
Index. 
For example, if CPU usage is enabled in the Gilgamesh GUI, Gilgamesh will, 
when dynamically instrumenting the application's binary, extract per-node CPU usage 
from the application and store this information in the database. The correction script is 
then called and, instead of comparing this CPU usage value to a predetermined threshold, 
it takes this value and all previous recordings of this value for this run of the application 
and differentiates this data with respect to time. If it determines that that this parameter's 
slope is getting steeper at a sufficiently significant rate, the correction algorithm is 
triggered. Differentiating data in this manner is analogous with the concept of rate of 
occurrence of failure (ROCOF), discussed later in this dissertation. 
This approach goes beyond contemporary threshold-related schemes. Should an 
application always run at 95% CPU usage yet show no symptoms of potential failure, 
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Gilgamesh does not detect an anomaly. However, if an application typically utilizes 20% 
of the CPU, but has escalated to 30%, 50%, and 70% CPU usage over the past 5 minutes, 
then the tool identifies this as a potentially serious change of events. 
Once Gilgamesh determines that some aspect of the application is trending 
towards failure, the autonomous correction module is alerted and begins work on 
mitigating the anticipated failure before it occurs. At this point, Gilgamesh has a 
multitude of options at its disposal: Schemes such as process re-instantiation or 
migration, node rejuvenation, and checkpointing/restarting are all available as potential 
remedies for the deteriorating application. Many of the best ideas discussed in the 
previous chapter were cherry picked in Gilgamesh's implementation of fault mitigation. 
The remedy selected by Gilgamesh, of course, depends on the specific metric 
acting as catalyst for the failure. In general, node-related parameters such as CPU usage 
trigger process migration and node rejuvenation, while application-centric metrics such 
as floating point exceptions trigger process re-instantiation. Every attempt is made to 
avoid application-wide checkpoint/restart, as this form of fault-tolerance should be 
reserved for recovering from catastrophic failures. In scenarios where a proactive 
response to impending failure is possible, Gilgamesh chooses that approach. 
Current research and development on Gilgamesh focuses on instrumenting a 
number of HPC applications with a full-capacity build of this software, in an effort to 
generate a wealth of information related to the failures encountered by applications 
running at an extreme scale. This information, then, will be used to retool the software to 
perform its duties in a substantially less costly manner, while increasing its ability to 
accurately anticipate failure. Future work includes further decreasing the software's 
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overhead requirements and specifically increasing the intelligence of the autonomous 
correction component via the implementation of the FI. Real time monitoring using a 
combination of Gilgamesh and the FI is proposed as future work in Chapter 6. 
2.2 Examining HPC Application Metrics 
A common goal in studies done on resilience provision within HPC distributions 
is the development of an effective reliability, availability, and serviceability (RAS) 
logging and monitoring framework for detecting, circumventing, and quickly recovering 
from system and application failures. However, before this development can begin, it is 
both necessary and critical to characterize potential failure scenarios. This includes 
creating working definitions of these failures (as will be covered later in this document) 
and developing a sound understanding of the structural semantics and dependencies 
located within the target architecture. This section develops a means to characterize 
system- and application-level failures encountered within the HPC environment as a 
general architectural paradigm. Specifically, this section introduces the general concepts 
and procedures for describing an HPC dataset as used in the remainder of this 
dissertation. 
To develop a working dataset that was both tangible and rich in failure and 
performance information, a number of system logs from existing large- and extreme-
scale HPC deployments were obtained. The findings obtained by mining and modeling 
these records, combined with an in-depth examination and subsequent understanding of 
requisite HPC architectural components drive the bulk of this section. 
The multiple processors that serve as nodes within an HPC environment, much 
like those found in any other architectural permutation, output various information via 
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system- and application-level log files. However, as discussed in the previous section, 
there are a number of hurdles encountered when attempting to mine this information in 
an effort to better understand failure characteristics and capture system health indicators. 
As discussed in the first chapter, there is no standardized design method for 
culling performance information from these files, nor is there a standard means of 
arranging the data. In multi- and heterogeneous-core environments, in particular the 
dominant cluster computing model, there is the potential for any number of divergent 
processor technologies. Various manufacturers and clock speeds, amongst other 
discrepancies, lead to diverse, sometimes radically different log formats amongst nodes. 
This is a major obstacle in identifying overall environmental health, as, without another 
level of abstraction above the various node-specific reporting modules, performing any 
detailed comparisons between individual system components proves very cumbersome. 
Also, in most systems, only performance metrics pertaining to individual nodes 
or components within the individual machines are logged, and, as such, no multi-
component or system-wide performance indicators are currently used in formulating log 
data. These are often crucial values that must be taken into consideration when 
formulating a given system's overall health and viability. 
Briefly discussed in the first chapter, the Blue Gene/L (BG/L) log file is used as 
our test dataset in this section. BG/L, a well-known IBM-developed supercomputer, is an 
extreme-scale HPC deployment which strictly adheres to many of the core design 
principles of high performance computing and, as such, serves as a worthy target 
architecture for the study of HPC failure activity. Contained in its 710 MB, 4,747,963 
line log file was performance and error information covering a six month period, from 
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June 3rd, 2005 to January 4th, 2006. The information outlined in this section is the result 
of analysis into the behaviors and trends located within this rich performance dataset. 
According to the Top500 Supercomputer website, BG/L - located at Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory - was at one time the largest supercomputer in existence. 
The system is comprised of 106,496 dual-processor compute nodes, of which 67% are 
512 MB and 33% are 1 GB. It also contains 1,664 I/O nodes, 212,992 IBM PowerPC 
CPUs, and a total disk space of 1.89 PB. Within the Blue Gene/L architecture, each rack 
is divided into two parts: a top midplane and a bottom midplane. Each part contains 16 
node cards, 1 service card and 4 link cards, and there are 32 compute nodes and 4 
optional I/O nodes on each node card [79]. 
During the time interval covered in the log file, there were 4,747,963 messages 
sent to the log. Each message contains the time, location, RAS or NULL, facility, severity, 
and event description information shown in Figure 2.3. Locations are denoted by codes 
which represent a particular hardware component. 
2005-08-02-17.18.18.545821 HULL RAS BGLMASTER FAILURE »nics_seEvei: exited normally with exit code 1 
2005-08-02-18.05.32.652047 HULL RAS BGLMASTER FAILURE idoproxy exited normally with exit code 0 
2005-08-02-18.05.42.661358 HULL RAS BGLMASTER FAILURE mncs_server exited normally with exit code 15 
2005-08-02-18.05.47.668332 NULL RAS BGLMASTER FAILURE ciodb exited normally with exit code 15 
2005-08-03-13.34.51.000398 HULL RAS BGLMASTER FAILURE iamcs_server exited normally with exit code 15 
2005-08-10-09.09.58.139632 NULL RAS BGLMASTER FAILURE mmes_Berver exited normally with exit coda 15 
2005-08-12-07.20.27.921676 HULL RAS BGLMASTER FAILURE ciodb exited abnormally due to signal: Aborted 
Figure 2.3 An Example of BlueGene/L's Log Format 
The facility variable, found in every log entry, indicates the hardware or service 
affected by the corresponding reported event [80]. This value can be characterized into 
one of 10 types: MMCS, APP, KERNEL, LINKCARD, DISCOVERY, MONITOR, 
HARDWARE, CMCS, BGLMASTER, and SERV_NET. MMCS represents the system's 
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midplane management and control service, while CMCS stands for core management and 
control system. KERNEL indicates events related to hardware instruction and data 
manipulation. DISCOVERY is a service that monitors hardware changes. MONITOR is 
another control system component which provides various hardware status metrics such 
as temperature. BGLMASTER is a service that controls the MMCS. Also within the log 
messages are six severity levels: INFO, WARNING, SEVERE, ERROR, FATAL, and 
FAILURE. 
As outlined in Tables 2.1 and 2.2, 91% of messages contained in the log are 
generated by the KERNEL facility, and 79% of messages are of the INFO severity level. 
Also, 2% of all messages were generated by the DISCOVERY, MONITOR, and 
HARDWARE facilities - all indicating hardware abnormality - and 4% of all log data 
was generated by APP. 
Table 2.1 Number of Messages per Facility, BG/L 
Facility 
MMCS 
APP 
KERNEL 
CMCS 
BGLMASTER 
Number of Messages 
88,930 
228,536 
4,324,967 
211 
145 
Facility 
LINKCARD 
DISCOVERY 
MONITOR 
HARDWARE 
SERVNET 
Number of Messages 
1,170 
97,172 
1,681 
5,148 
3 
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Table 2.2 Number of Messages per Severity Level, BG/L 
.Severity 
Level 
INFO 
WARNING 
Number of 
Messages 
3,735,823 
23,357 
Severity 
Level 
SEVERE 
ERROR 
Number of 
Messages 
19,213 
112,355 
Severity 
Level 
FATAL 
FAILURE 
Number of 
Messages 
855,501 
1,714 
The FAILURE severity level contained messages produced exclusively by failing 
system components. It was also observed that many event descriptions in the FATAL 
level represented failure activity, such as "panic: -stopping execution". It was 
consequently assumed that all failure events were located in the FATAL or FAILURE 
severity levels and, given that the objective of this initial study was the isolation and 
analysis of failure information from a given BG/L log file, messages other than those of 
FATAL and FAILURE severity were discarded. This resulted in a collection of 855,501 
FATAL and 1,714 FAILURE messages, which are further detailed in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 
respectively. 
Table 2.3 Time between FATAL Messages, BG/L 
Time Between FATAL Messages 
Number of Messages 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Mean 
Median 
855,501 
0 seconds 
303533 seconds 
21.683 seconds 
0 seconds 
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Table 2.4 Time between FAILURE Messages, BG/L 
Time Between FAILURE Messages 
Number of Messages 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Mean 
Median 
1,714 
0 seconds 
3382246 seconds 
8,193 seconds 
0 seconds 
The mean values found in these results suggest that FATAL and FAILURE 
messages are generated at an incredibly high frequency. Further, a median value of 
nearly 0 seconds for both the time between FATAL messages and the time between 
FAILURE messages confirms that more than half of all failure-related messages are 
generated almost simultaneously. After further analysis, it was found that there existed a 
number of FATAL-tagged messages that did not, in fact, suggest legitimate system 
failures. For example, "guaranteed data cache block touch", "store 
operation 7", or "instruction address space 0" are all tagged as FATAL, 
but do not result in the system entering a compromised state. However, many of them -
such as "Power deactivated", "kernel terminated" and "Lustre mount FAILED" -
strongly suggested traceable system failures. 
It was discovered that in many cases a single FATAL or FAILURE message may 
be repeatedly and massively reported. For example, 346 FAILURE messages, containing 
the message "Temperature over Limit on link card' were repeatedly reported from 2005-
11-07-12.28.58 to 2005-11-07-12.37.20. Put into perspective, that single message was 
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generated almost every second for close to ten minutes. Because of this phenomenon, 
two datasets, U and L, were constructed. 
The first dataset U contains all FATAL and FAILURE messages, less those that 
do not infer actual, legitimate system failures. U, then, represents an upper bound for all 
system failure behavior that has been reported in the log, as it contains all reported 
system failures. Certain message patterns, such as those containing only numeric codes, 
were filtered from the data as non-failure messages, and are not included in U. The 
second dataset L contains only those FATAL and FAILURE messages inferring system 
failures. Similarly, L represents a lower bound for reported system failure behavior, as it 
is a subset of the actual failures. Like in U, particular message patterns were used to form 
L via the extraction of messages that suggested system- or application-affecting failures. 
Repeated messages stemming from a single failure were removed from both 
datasets, as the target of this study is less the messages in the log file and more the actual 
failure behavior of the system. This process is conducted inductively with a time interval 
of 60 seconds. As an illustration, suppose that there are three identical messages from the 
same source appearing at times 1, 30, and 100 seconds after log initialization. Because 
the time between messages one and two is 29 seconds, message two is removed from 
both datasets. However, because the time between messages two and three is 70 seconds, 
message three is not removed. The time between the individual messages contained in 
both datasets is summarized in Table 2.5. 
37 
Table 2.5 Time between Messages, Datasets U and L 
Time Between Messages, L 
Count 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Mean 
Median 
72208 
0 
460,510 seconds 
254,101 seconds 
0 
Time Between Messages, U 
Count 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Mean 
Median 
185102 
0 
330,072 seconds 
100.0569 seconds 
0 
Although the mean time between the messages contained in both datasets appears 
longer than the mean found in the original data, the value remains extremely low. In 
researching the genesis for this abnormality, it was discovered that many of the logged 
messages stemming from a single incident and occurring during similar time windows 
were reported by a large group of nodes. For example, 2,048 compute nodes reported an 
"rts internal error" within a very small timeframe - from 2005-06-14-11.15.09 to 2005-
06-14-11.16.15 (a window of only one minute and six seconds). 
However, because this dissertation is most concerned with failure information 
suggesting application interruption (recall from the previous chapter our working 
definitions for both failure and resilience), the time between messages data was further 
processed by making an assumption that the system has a certain amount of time to 
repair and that a given application uses all nodes in the system. If the time between two 
failures is less than time to repair, the latter failure can no longer affect the application 
because the system is being repaired and is no longer in production mode. Thus, any time 
between failures less than or equal to the time to repair those failures could be removed 
from the datasets. For the purposes of this section, the results of this removal are 
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examined using four different time to repair values—1, 5, 10, and 20 minutes. The 
results are summarized in Table 2.6 and Table 2.7. 
Table 2.6 Time between Messages, L, After Repeated Message Removal 
Time to Repair (L) 
Count 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Mean 
Median 
1 min 
476 
10.08 min 
5.3 day 
10.69 hrs 
3.96 hrs 
5 min 
453 
10.52 min 
5.3 day 
11.24 hrs 
4.94 hrs 
10 min 
436 
10.6 min 
5.3 day 
11.67 hrs 
5.6 hrs 
20 min 
375 
20.25 min 
5.3 day 
13.53 hrs 
8.26 hrs 
Table 2.7 Time between Messages, U, After Repeated Message Removal 
Time to Repair (U) 
Count 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Mean 
Median 
1 min 
1023 
1 min 
3.8 day 
5.02 hrs 
1.81 hrs 
5 min 
912 
5.23 min 
3.8 day 
5.63 hrs 
2.41 hrs 
10 min 
872 
10.05 min 
3.8 day 
5.89 hrs 
2.57 hrs 
20 min 
741 
20.1 min 
3.8 day 
6.97 hrs 
3.56 hrs 
By using the datasets L and U, which represent the best and worst case system 
failure behavior respectively, the results form Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 suggest that the 
mean time to interrupt for a BG/L application plausibly falls between 5 and 14 hours, 
depending on the utilized time to repair. 
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In addition, when a single failure generates multiple messages, the first messages 
generated will typically have a larger amount of time between them while their 
duplicates will have a much smaller time between messages. This suggests that for 
duplicate messages a large time between messages should change very little after the 
TTR becomes larger than time between messages. Time between message measures for 
both U and L of more than 100 minutes are very stable for all TTR of one minute or 
more, indicating that one minute is sufficient to remove the vast majority of duplicate 
messages for a single root cause. 
In conclusion, results suggested that the BG/L system has a mean time to failure 
(MTTF) of 5.89 hours - or roughly 4 times a day - for an application with a time to 
repair often minutes. This is also assuming a full, evenly distributed system load, which 
is of course not always the case. Failures may occur as often as 10.6 minutes apart, or, 
likewise, one could go days (in the case of the 10 minute MTTR assumption - 3.8 days) 
without observing a system breakdown. 
This initial study proved that BG/L's log files provide a wealth of information, 
but much of it is of no use to those interested in provisioning resilient applications for it 
and similar technologies without first filtering the data and performing appropriate 
statistical analysis to arrive at correct and logical values. Similarly, the results gathered 
from observing BG/L are not comparable to those of other systems without first 
developing a way to normalize the data. 
The remainder of this dissertation and, in fact, the novel contribution of this 
work, will be devoted to developing such a measure. By first conceptually introducing 
inequality indices and then demonstrating their effectiveness in describing the failure 
40 
behavior on an HPC system reliability dataset, the following chapter demonstrates the 
utility of such a measure. 
CHAPTER 3 
INEQUALITY MEASURES FOR HPC RELIABILITY 
DATA 
3.1 Introduction and Justification 
A needed element in the study of resilient High Performance Computing (HPC) 
applications is the creation and widespread adoption of a normalized metric representing 
an application's failure behavior [81, 82]. Such a metric opens the door for enhanced 
quality of service provision and a set of standard operating expectations for large-scale 
HPC application development and execution. 
The contemporary expansion in HPC system size and complexity has generated a 
lack of quantitative expectations in application performance due to the volatile failure 
activity encountered when computing at such a high scale [83]. A standardized and 
widely adopted failure metric expedites the process of informing research, development 
and administration personnel of unexpected application behavior and acts as notification 
that application processes are failing to maintain an adequate level of performability 
[84]. 
In this chapter, inequality indices are introduced from a statistical point of view 
and applied to an existing HPC dataset. These metrics serve as the initial step in the long-
term research and development of new resilience-related values, as their scale- and 
location-invariant nature and normalized representation allow HPC researchers to 
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adequately compare inequality in failure behavior across various systems and 
applications. Specifically, the Gini, Atkinson and Theil indices are introduced in this 
chapter, with the final sections detailing the application of the Gini and Atkinson indices 
to an HPC system reliability dataset. 
3.2 The Lorenz Curve 
Inequality indices are based on the Lorenz curve, introduced in 1905 by Max 
Otto Lorenz as a graphical representation of a distribution's level of equality, wherein 
observed events are compared to distributions with perfect equality [85]. The Lorenz 
curve is based on a convex function, and has been widely adopted by economists for use 
in comparing income distributions [86]. 
Figure 3.1 shows an example Lorenz curve. The plot is a 45 degree line with the 
y-axis representing the percent of event occurrence and the x-axis representing, as a 
percentage, an increase in population. Logically, then, the upper limit for both scales is 
100 - one hundred percent of a population earns, for example, one hundred percent of all 
income and, analogously, zero percent of the population earns zero percent of all income. 
When income is distributed evenly - that is, 10% of the population earns 10 
percent of the income, 50% of the population earns 50 percent of the income, and so on -
the Lorenz curve represents what is called the egalitarian line, or the line of absolute 
equality. The egalitarian line is represented by the 45-degree line in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 Lorenz Curve Given Total Equality 
The representation of unequal distributions results in an empirical Lorenz curve 
(L) which is well defined on the interval [0,1]. Note that 1,(0) = 0, L(l) = 1. If all 
event values followed a uniform distribution, then, the empirical Lorentz curve would 
equal the egalitarian Lorenz curve as shown in Figure 3.1. However this is typically not 
the case and the empirical Lorenz curve L rests below the diagonal, as shown in (3.1). 
The Lorenz curve is defined as 
L (
» = WVT f F-\v)du, 
F _ 1(s) = inf{u: F(u) > s); 0 < s < 1 . (3.1) 
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Here, F is the distribution's cumulative distribution function. One can compare 
the difference in inequality between two distributions by comparing their Lorenz curves, 
with the curve that most deviates from the line of absolute equality representing the 
distribution containing the higher amount of inequality. This situation is represented in 
Figure 3.2, with the Lorenz curve closer to the right and bottom of the graph representing 
a distribution containing more inequality than the distribution represented by the Lorenz 
curve closest to the line of absolute equality. 
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Figure 3.2 Lorenz Curves for Two Distributions with Varying Levels of Inequality 
The following three sections introduce various types of inequality indices -
means of representing the inequality in a distribution via the creation of location- and 
scale-invariant coefficients. All three are based on the Lorenz curve. 
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3.3 The Gini Index 
The Gini index is a normalized measure of the statistical inequality of a given 
dataset which generates a coefficient based on a 0-to-l system, with a value of 0 
measuring total equality and a value of 1 measuring total inequality. Using an example 
illustrating this metric's use in economics, the Gini index is often used to express the 
level of inequality in national income distributions, with as of 2009 Sweden having the 
world's lowest Gini coefficient (0.23) and South Africa having one of the highest (0.67) 
[100]. This implies that Sweden has the most equal distribution of wealth amongst the 
world's nations, and South Africa has one of the most unequal. Taking this to an 
extreme, a nation reporting a Gini coefficient of 1 in such a study would indicate that one 
individual controls all of that nation's wealth, with the remaining members of the 
population each having no income. Likewise, a Gini coefficient of 0 would indicate that 
all individuals in a given country earn the exact same income. 
Statistically, the Gini Index measures the ratio of the area between the Lorenz 
curve (L(p)) and the line of absolute equality ( / ), to the area under that line, which is 
1/2. More easily stated, the Gini Index (3.2) represents twice the area between / and 
L(p), which can be mathematically expressed as 
GF:=2 \ \I-L(p)\dt. (3.2) 
When one uses the Gini index, a Gini coefficient is generated which represents 
the level of inequality measured. As mentioned, a perfectly uniform distribution would 
generate a Gini coefficient of zero, as mathematically there would be no area between 
the line of absolute equality and the Lorenz curve. Likewise, in the event of complete 
inequality, the Gini coefficient would be 1, coinciding with straight lines at the lower and 
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right boundaries of the curve. The general definition for the Gini index (3.3) , where X1 
and X2 are independent random variables with mean jU, is 
GF = — £ ( | * ! - X2\) = — [ [ \Xl-x2\ dF{x1)dF{x2) . (3.3) 
L\i C.[i JR JR 
In addition to economics, the Gini Index has applications in biodiversity [87], 
chemistry [88], agriculture [89], and engineering [90]. In general, it can be used to 
measure any subject involving a distribution. 
3.4 The Atkinson Index 
The Atkinson index is similar to the Gini index, with the notable inclusion of a 
coefficient that allows it to examine movement within different sections of a distribution 
[91]. The Atkinson index becomes more sensitive to changes at the lower end of the 
distribution as this coefficient approaches 0. Conversely, as this coefficient approaches 1, 
the Atkinson index becomes more sensitive to changes at the upper end of the 
distribution. Like the Gini index, the Atkinson index generates a coefficient which 
measures a distribution's departure from uniformity using a 0-to-l system, again with 0 
representing total equality and 1 representing total inequality. The Atkinson index given 
multiple events yx,..., yn with mean \i (3.4) is properly defined as 
A£(y1,...,yn) = 
I 
1 / 1 
1 
1=1
 1 . (3.4) 
N 
-l\Jily>") • ° < £ < 1 
l -KD- • £ = 1 
The distinguishing feature of the Atkinson Index is its ability to measure 
movements in different segments of a given distribution. Like the Gini index, the 
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Atkinson index has seen uses largely in economics, but also in biodiversity and 
chemistry, amongst other fields. The inclusion of the parameter makes it particularly 
useful when applied to large data sets. 
3.5 The Theil Index 
The Theil index is a measure of inequality closely related to the Atkinson index -
in fact, a Theil coefficient can be transformed into an Atkinson coefficient and vice-
versa. Specifically, the Theil index is a measure of entropy, where maximum entropy 
occurs when there is perfect equality [92]. 
Like the Gini and Atkinson indices, the Theil index generates a coefficient based 
on a 0-to-l scheme. Here, however, the coefficient measures the level of entropy in the 
distribution, rather than the level of inequality. It is important to note than an increasing 
Theil index does not indicate increasing entropy. It instead indicates an increasing level 
of redundancy - the gap between maximum and actual entropy. Thus, it actually 
indicates decreasing entropy. The general Theil index given multiple events xt, ...,xn, 
where xt is the value of the ith event in the distribution, X is the mean value of all events 
in the distribution and N is the population (3.5) is defined as 
The following section introduces the HPC dataset to which the Gini and Atkinson 
indices will be applied. Following that, the resulting coefficients and Lorenz curves 
generated by that dataset will be reported. Finally, various conclusions will be drawn 
relative to these results. 
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3.6 Application to HPC Data and Results 
3.6.1 Introduction to the Dataset 
This section demonstrates the utility of inequality indexing by generating Gini 
and Atkinson coefficients for each of the 23 HPC machines housed at Los Alamos 
National Laboratory from 1996 to 2005. The dataset containing this information was 
released in 2005 as a collection of CSV files and was initially analyzed by Schroeder et 
al from Carnegie Mellon University's Parallel Data Laboratory [99]. In that initial study, 
a number of statistical conclusions are drawn in a similar fashion to our team's later 
work on the BlueGene/L machine at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, which 
was discussed in Chapter 2. 
Gini, Atkinson (with parameter 0.99) and Atkinson (with parameter 0.20) 
coefficients will now be generated for each system contained in the log file. Doing so 
will both demonstrate the viability of inequality index coefficients as a metric for 
comparing HPC system failure inequality as well as provide finer-grain information 
regarding the inequality stemming from each machine's failure behavior during the time 
frame covered in the log file. 
The nearly 3 MB file contains 23,739 failure events from 23 of LANL's systems, 
accrued over a nine-year period. To maintain confidentiality, each system is labeled 
using a number system from 2 to 24 (systems "2", "3", etc), with System 2 being the 
oldest system recorded in the log and System 24 being the youngest. Each failure record 
contains the time when a failure was first reported (labeled 'prob started'), the time when 
the issue causing the failure was resolved ('prob fixed'), the total system downtime (in 
minutes) resulting from the failure, the system and node affected by the failure, the type 
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of workload running on the node at the time of the failure and the root cause of the 
failure. Screenshots representing the left and right halves of the original CSV file (taken 
from the same sample) are shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, respectively. 
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80 
80 
80 
32 
32 
32 
32 
32 
32 
32 
cputype 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
memtype 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Figure 3.3 Leftmost Columns Sample, LANL Failure Dataset 
Prob started {-nm/dd/yy hh:mmf Prob Fixed (rnm/dd/yy hh:mm) Down 
6/21/200510:54 
9/6/2005 9:13 
9/6/200510:32 
9/«/200514:50 
9/8/2005 16:52 
9/9/2005 9:44 
9/9/200511:44 
2/23/199713:00 
2/24/1997 7:10 
3/3/139710:00 
3/5/199717:30 
3/6/199717:30 
3/11/199723:20 
3/17/199723:05 
6/21/2005 11:00 
9/6/20059:19 
9/6/2005 10:46 
9/6/200515:08 
9/8/200516:57 
9/9/2C05 5:51 
9/9/2005 11:55 
2/23/1997 14:00 
2/24/19977-20 
3/3/199710:25 
3/5/199717 40 
3/6/1997 17:40 
3/12/19970:01 
3/17/1997 23:54 
Time Facshtie 
6 
6 
14 
IS 
5 
7 
11 
60 
10 
25 
10 
10 
41 
49 
Hardware Human Error Network undetermined Software 
Graphics Acce! Hdwr 
other software 
Undetermined 
Othe 
Undetermined 
Undetermined 
Other 
DST 
DST 
Maintenance 
DST 
DST 
Unresolvable 
Other 
Software 
Software 
Same Event 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Figure 3.4 Rightmost Columns Sample, LANL Failure Dataset 
Failures are detected by an automated monitoring system that pages operations 
staff whenever a node is down. The operations staff then creates a failure record in the 
database specifying the start time of the failure and the system and node affected. They 
then turn the node over to a system administrator for repair. Upon repair, the system 
administrator notifies the operations staff, who then put the node back into the job mix 
and fill in the end time of the failure record. If the system administrator was able to 
identify the root cause of the problem, he provides operations staff with the appropriate 
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information for the 'root cause' field of the failure record. Otherwise the root cause is 
specified as 'undetermined'. Note that the dataset covers each of the 23 systems only 
during their time in a production environment, and testing/debugging as well as 
maintenance time periods are not covered. 
Though it covers multiple systems, the LANL dataset is similar to the BG/L 
dataset in that various sources of failure are broken up into facilities. As in Chapter 2, 
'facilities' here refers to the various components of the system acting as possible origins 
for the failures that occur on that system. The facilities themselves are however not 
identical to those found in the BG/L dataset. Instead of the ten facilities represented 
there, in the LANL data there are only five: HARDWARE, SOFTWARE, NETWORK, 
HUMAN ERROR, and UNDETERMINED. 
Further, instead of the machine or operating system autonomously generating the 
facility of origin in the log file, here an actual human being records the suspected facility 
in the log, which is later investigated and confirmed or changed at subsequent operations 
staff meetings. The log also contains a column for noting whether the current failure 
event is due to the previously listed event, again decided by a human operator, not the 
system itself. Again, it is important to note that the dataset contains information from 
multiple machines, which is unlike the previously-used BG/L data (which contained 
information from only one system). 
Each entry in the log file contains numerous columns. Specifically, those 
columns are the name ("2", "3", etc.) and type (cluster, graphics card, etc.) of each 
system containing a logged event, the number of nodes housed in that system, the total 
number of processes running on the machine as well as the number of processes running 
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on each node in the machine at the time of the failure, the machine node reporting the 
failure, the installation date and production commission and decommission dates of that 
node, the purpose of that node, the start and end dates of the failure in question, the total 
downtime in minutes caused by the failure in question, and finally the facility of origin 
for that failure. This analysis pays specific attention to the 'system' and 'down time' 
columns of each entry -inequality coefficients are generated for system down time for 
each of the 23 machines found in the file. All of these failures are caused by one of the 
five facilities reported in the log. Recall that the scale- and location-invariant nature of 
inequality indexing allows us to compare entries reported by multiple machines with one 
another, regardless of node count or system type. This is why the LANL dataset and its 
23 machines were chosen for this case study. 
The following section reports the resulting inequality coefficients for each of the 
23 systems found in the log file. Coefficients were generated via the Gini and Atkinson 
indices, with two parameter variations utilized for the Atkinson index: e = 0.99, which 
generates an Atkinson index coefficient utilizing all events found in the file, and 8 = 
0.20, which was chosen in accordance with the findings from [103], which found that 
"redistributions at the lower end of the distribution also have a greater impact on 
mortality." 
Recall the formulation of the Gini index from (3.3). For this dataset, then, the 
Gini index coefficient is computed with respect to Z)(XJ), the amount of system 
downtime (in minutes) caused by an individual failure xt, i = 1, ...,n . Here, x1 
represents the earliest failure record located in the dataset and xn represents the latest, 
with (j. representing the average downtime caused by each failure event located in the 
52 
file. The cumulative distribution function F(i), representing the amount of downtime 
caused by all failures up to i (3.6), is then: 
i 
F(i)= JVxi ) . (3.6) 
The Atkinson index coefficient is also calculated with respect to the downtime 
caused by each failure record located in the log file. Using the conventions from (3.4), 
the Atkinson index coefficient is calculated with respect to yt = D(x{), with yx 
representing the down time caused by the earliest failure recorded to the log file and yn 
representing the downtime caused by the latest. N represents the total number of failures 
recorded to the dataset and p, represents the average amount of system downtime caused 
by each failure. 
Results were generated for the 20th, 40th, 60th, 80th, and 100th percentile of events 
found in the LANL data relative to each of the 23 systems. Each system's failures were 
grouped according to their time of occurrence, with the first event in each group being 
the one generated by the earliest failure, and the last event being the one generated by the 
latest. These percentiles then represent the lifetime of each system as represented in the 
dataset. The resulting coefficients will illustrate the level of inequality in the downtime 
caused by each system failure as each of these systems age. Further, Lorenz curves were 
created for each of the 23 systems. Lastly, the 23 resulting Gini coefficients were 
averaged in relation to each percentile. All of these results are reported in section 3.6.2. 
Section 3.6.3 will draw conclusions from these results. 
53 
3.6.2 Results 
Tables 3.1 through 3.23 display the per-percentile inequality coefficients 
generated for each of the 23 systems found in the LANL failure dataset. Figures 3.5 
through 3.73 show bar graphs showing the resulting impact D(xt) of each failure xt 
exhibited by the system, histograms showing the frequency of system failures at various 
levels of impact are also given (note that the log of these values has been taken to better 
illustrate differences in failure activity between each system) and a Lorenz curve for each 
system, representing the overall level of inequality in the downtime resulting from each 
failure incurred by that system. 
Following the generation of inequality coefficients, bar graphs, histograms and 
Lorenz curves for all 23 systems, the resulting Gini, Atkinson (s =0.20), and Atkinson 
(8=0.99) coefficients were grouped according to percentile and subsequently averaged. 
The resulting values located in Table 3.24 represent the average fluctuation in inequality 
for the down time caused by all failures across all systems as these systems age. 
Conclusions based on these results will be drawn in the following section. 
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Table 3.1 Inequality Coefficients, System 2, LANL Data 
System 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Percentile 
20th 
40th 
60th 
80th 
100th 
Failures 
1421 
2842 
4263 
5684 
7105 
Downtime (min.) 
211,800 
518,491 
687,349 
794,993 
1,008,366 
Gini 
0.6010276 
0.6731329 
0.6908012 
0.6732575 
0.6827248 
Atk (.99) 
0.534944 
0.6346716 
0.6356018 
0.5996397 
0.6047009 
Atk (.20) 
0.1286560 
0.2116812 
0.2292204 
0.2147699 
0.2245452 
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Figure 3.5 Impact of Each Failure, System 2, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.6 Lorenz Curve, System 2, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.7 Failure Impact Histogram, System 2, LANL Data 
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Table 3.2 Inequality Coefficients, System 3, LANL Data 
System 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Percentile 
20th 
40th 
60th 
80th 
100th 
Failures 
58 
122 
184 
236 
299 
Downtime (min.) 
5,736 
13,383 
19,382 
33,489 
40,386 
Gini 
0.6523049 
0.6474038 
0.6375234 
0.7124483 
0.6840931 
Atk (.99) 
0.5747176 
0.5700684 
0.5412378 
0.6315552 
0.5940145 
Atk (.20) 
0.1595362 
0.1510210 
0.1517705 
0.2135558 
0.1941182 
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Figure 3.8 Impact of Each Failure, System 3, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.9 Lorenz Curve, System 3, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.10 Failure Impact Histogram, System 3, LANL Data 
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Table 3.3 Inequality Coefficients, System 4, LANL Data 
System 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Percentile 
20th 
40th 
60th 
80th 
100th 
Failures 
63 
118 
190 
230 
299 
Downtime (min.) 
5,759 
11,171 
18,896 
27,713 
40,101 
Gini 
0.5286301 
0.5802441 
0.5478803 
0.605446 
0.6151453 
Atk (.99) 
0.4269491 
0.4862753 
0.4409907 
0.5069202 
0.5224879 
Atk (.20) 
0.09448456 
0.1187666 
0.1046655 
0.1428101 
0.1475057 
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Figure 3.11 Impact of Each Failure, System 4, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.12 Lorenz Curve, System 4, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.13 Failure Impact Histogram, System 4, LANL Data 
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Table 3.4 Inequality Coefficients, System 5, LANL Data 
System 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Percentile 
20m 
40th 
60th 
80m 
100th 
Failures 
59 
124 
181 
246 
305 
Downtime (min.) 
10,683 
20,104 
26,212 
36,974 
44,641 
Gini 
0.6821483 
0.6740514 
0.6593811 
0.6702198 
0.6501178 
Atk (.99) 
0.5886865 
0.5828212 
0.5582976 
0.5747256 
0.550562 
Atk (.20) 
0.2028295 
0.1817055 
0.1723399 
0.1787636 
0.1651481 
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Figure 3.14 Impact of Each Failure, System 5, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.15 Lorenz Curve, System 5, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.16 Failure Impact Histogram, System 5, LANL Data 
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Table 3.5 Inequality Coefficients, System 6, LANL Data 
System 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
Percentile 
20th 
40th 
60th 
80th 
100th 
Failures 
17 
27 
35 
45 
64 
Downtime (min.) 
2,607 
3,806 
4,302 
4,633 
7,178 
Gini 
0.6746124 
0.676484 
0.6902305 
0.676087 
0.6535421 
Atk (.99) 
0.6037954 
0.5857101 
0.6058226 
0.5748184 
0.5566991 
Atk (.20) 
0.1850318 
0.1882174 
0.1843178 
0.1837073 
0.1592298 
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Figure 3.17 Impact of Each Failure, System 6, LANL Data 
63 
•B 
i-i 
00 02 04 06 08 10 
Figure 3.18 Lorenz Curve, System 6, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.19 Failure Impact Histogram, System 6, LANL Data 
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Table 3.6 Inequality Coefficients, System 7, LANL Data 
System 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
Percentile 
20th 
40th 
60th 
80th 
100th 
Failures 
25 
54 
77 
104 
129 
Downtime (min.) 
2,902 
7,430 
12,075 
18,002 
34,323 
Gini 
0.2843005 
0.4077613 
0.4426404 
0.4624144 
0.6428636 
Atk (.99) 
0.1302336 
0.2752189 
0.3044237 
0.3183379 
0.5383517 
Atk (.20) 
0.03110032 
0.05774089 
0.0680330 
0.0761484 
0.1940597 
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Figure 3.20 Impact of Each Failure, System 7, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.21 Lorenz Curve, System 7, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.22 Failure Impact Histogram, System 7, LANL Data 
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Table 3.7 Inequality Coefficients, System 8, LANL Data 
System 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
Percentile 
20th 
40th 
60m 
80th 
100th 
Failures 
89 
190 
285 
386 
475 
Downtime (min.) 
208,409 
328,866 
499,239 
836,041 
977,672 
Gini 
0.8794655 
0.8680784 
0.8493329 
0.8240501 
0.8083147 
Atk (.99) 
0.9185997 
0.9003143 
0.8862067 
0.8720414 
0.8593525 
Atk (.20) 
0.3480385 
0.3357564 
0.3141345 
0.2832965 
0.2694886 
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Figure 3.23 Impact of Each Failure, System 8, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.24 Lorenz Curve, System 8, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.25 Failure Impact Histogram, System 8, LANL Data 
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Table 3.8 Inequality Coefficients, System 9, LANL Data 
System 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
Percentile 
20th 
40th 
60th 
80th 
100th 
Failures 
56 
112 
168 
224 
280 
Downtime (min.) 
249,154 
266,823 
274,393 
281,007 
290,964 
Gini 
0.9172414 
0.9346124 
0.9462083 
0.9510054 
0.9506572 
Atk (.99) 
0.9878632 
0.9999993 
1 
1 
1 
Atk (.20) 
0.4167057 
0.4590362 
0.490213 
0.5069014 
0.5108189 
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Figure 3.26 Impact of Each Failure, System 9, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.27 Lorenz Curve, System 9, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.28 Failure Impact Histogram, System 9, LANL Data 
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Table 3.9 Inequality Coefficients, System 10, LANL Data 
System 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
Percentile 
20th 
40th 
60th 
80th 
100th 
Failures 
47 
94 
141 
190 
237 
Downtime (min.) 
269,867 
285,196 
300,167 
389,218 
392,114 
Gini 
0.868898 
0.9093874 
0.9231305 
0.9141034 
0.926879 
Atk (.99) 
0.9822825 
0.999917 
0.9999997 
0.9999993 
0.9999999 
Atk (.20) 
0.3491037 
0.4094456 
0.4360462 
0.4118522 
0.4352492 
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Figure 3.29 Impact of Each Failure, System 10, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.30 Lorenz Curve, System 10, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.31 Failure Impact Histogram, System 10, LANL Data 
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Table 3.10 Inequality Coefficients, System 11, LANL Data 
System Percentile 
20th 
40th 
60th 
80th 
100th 
Failures 
53 
109 
159 
218 
268 
Downtime (min.) 
356,159 
374,986 
406,813 
412998 
418,993 
Gini 
0.901521 
0.9318934 
0.9343652 
0.9450112 
0.9494329 
Atk (.99) 
0.9824175 
0.999996 
1 
1 
1 
Atk (.20) 
0.3898342 
0.4497052 
0.459456 
0.4855938 
0.4992231 
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Figure 3.32 Impact of Each Failure, System 11, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.33 Lorenz Curve, System 11, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.34 Failure Impact Histogram, System 11, LANL Data 
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Table 3.11 Inequality Coefficients, System 12, LANL Data 
System 
12 
12 
12 
12 
12 
Percentile 
20th 
40th 
60th 
80th 
100th 
Failures 
51 
107 
153 
204 
259 
Downtime (min.) 
242,749 
254,317 
283,519 
292,791 
299,825 
Gini 
0.9010614 
0.9353616 
0.9339544 
0.938812 
0.9407131 
Atk (.99) 
0.9691547 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Atk (.20) 
0.4003552 
0.4663913 
0.4650438 
0.4790362 
0.488347 
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Figure 3.35 Impact of Each Failure, System 12, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.36 Lorenz Curve, System 12, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.37 Failure Impact Histogram, System 12, LANL Data 
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Table 3.12 Inequality Coefficients, System 13, LANL Data 
System 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
Percentile 
20th 
40th 
60th 
80th 
100th 
Failures 
39 
81 
115 
159 
201 
Downtime (min.) 
359,810 
379,558 
394,761 
403,719 
441,075 
Gini 
0.8414183 
0.8931308 
0.9074928 
0.9239984 
0.9494189 
Atk (.99) 
0.9467759 
0.973137 
0.9999994 
1 
1 
Atk (.20) 
0.3249069 
0.3926667 
0.4176841 
0.4471762 
0.4596139 
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Figure 3.38 Impact of Each Failure, System 13, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.39 Lorenz Curve, System 13, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.40 Failure Impact Histogram, System 13, LANL Data 
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Table 3.13 Inequality Coefficients, System 14, LANL Data 
System 
14 
14 
14 
14 
14 
Percentile 
20th 
40th 
60th 
80th 
100th 
Failures 
24 
56 
80 
102 
125 
Downtime (min.) 
29,061 
697,322 
704,071 
728,867 
738,907 
Gini 
0.829304 
0.9253138 
0.942445 
0.9469915 
0.9514942 
Atk (.99) 
0.9784576 
0.9942794 
0.9948515 
0.997793 
0.9993597 
Atk (.20) 
0.3094202 
0.4290339 
0.4664413 
0.4771013 
0.4909886 
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Figure 3.41 Impact of Each Failure, System 14, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.42 Lorenz Curve, System 14, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.43 Failure Impact Histogram, System 14, LANL Data 
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Table 3.14 Inequality Coefficients, System 15, LANL Data 
System 
15 
15 
15 
15 
15 
Percentile 
20th 
40th 
60th 
80th 
100th 
Failures 
11 
28 
36 
44 
54 
Downtime (min.) 
391 
4,579 
5,118 
6,046 
7,470 
Gini 
0.5607998 
0.7633997 
0.7457014 
0.724897 
0.7406217 
Atk (.99) 
0.4344859 
0.7228064 
0.6893286 
0.6711294 
0.6840907 
Atk (.20) 
0.1257257 
0.2411162 
0.2306536 
0.2138146 
0.2201631 
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Figure 3.44 Impact of Each Failure, System 15, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.46 Failure Impact Histogram, System 15, LANL Data 
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Table 3.15 Inequality Coefficients, System 16, LANL Data 
System 
16 
16 
16 
16 
16 
Percentile 
20th 
40th 
60th 
80th 
100th 
Failures 
540 
1,080 
1,614 
2,147 
2,680 
Downtime (min.) 
61,494 
149,227 
664,537 
1,219,242 
1,445,023 
Gini 
0.700608 
0.7370584 
0.9022084 
0.9317911 
0.9215625 
Atk (.99) 
0.6923546 
0.7315113 
0.8946175 
0.924417 
0.911852 
Atk (.20) 
0.2129928 
0.2465563 
0.5427902 
0.5807508 
0.5371212 
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Figure 3.47 Impact of Each Failure, System 16, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.48 Lorenz Curve, System 16, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.49 Failure Impact Histogram, System 16, LANL Data 
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Table 3.16 Inequality Coefficients, System 17, LANL Data 
System 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
Percentile 
20th 
40th 
60th 
80th 
100th 
Failures 
22 
49 
77 
104 
126 
Downtime (min.) 
3,260 
5,434 
10,232 
12,881 
15,651 
Gini 
0.6989682 
0.7013287 
0.7175553 
0.72673 
0.7847755 
Atk (.99) 
0.6530687 
0.6423195 
0.6857478 
0.68572 
0.7355964 
Atk (.20) 
0.1836791 
0.1851869 
0.1917146 
0.2003400 
0.2148792 
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Figure 3.50 Impact of Each Failure, System 17, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.51 Lorenz Curve, System 17, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.52 Failure Impact Histogram, System 17, LANL Data 
86 
Table 3.17 Inequality Coefficients, System 18, LANL Data 
System 
18 
18 
18 
18 
18 
Percentile 
20th 
40th 
60th 
80th 
100th 
Failures 
797 
1,614 
2,378 
3,224 
3,997 
Downtime (min.) 
196,049 
362,808 
466,939 
577,409 
716,641 
Gini 
0.7050154 
0.712082 
0.7095604 
0.709114 
0.7092562 
Atk (.99) 
0.6213237 
0.6282973 
0.6257881 
0.6251526 
0.6276465 
Atk (.20) 
0.2172665 
0.2339089 
0.2253477 
0.2219993 
0.2229577 
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Figure 3.53 Impact of Each Failure, System 18, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.54 Lorenz Curve, System 18, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.55 Failure Impact Histogram, System 18, LANL Data 
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Table 3.18 Inequality Coefficients, System 19, LANL Data 
System 
19 
19 
19 
19 
19 
Percentile 
20th 
40th 
60th 
80th 
100th 
Failures 
661 
1,298 
1,992 
2,656 
3,284 
Downtime (min.) 
179,209 
278,133 
377,358 
493,133 
681,077 
Gini 
0.7520437 
0.7269844 
0.7296928 
0.7152188 
0.7409367 
Atk (.99) 
0.6696452 
0.6355074 
0.640358 
0.6226461 
0.6561462 
Atk (.20) 
0.2678224 
0.2520972 
0.2476286 
0.2286325 
0.2670949 
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Figure 3.56 Impact of Each Failure, System 19, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.57 Lorenz Curve, System 19, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.58 Failure Impact Histogram, System 19, LANL Data 
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Table 3.19 Inequality Coefficients, System 20, LANL Data 
System 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
Percentile 
20tn 
40th 
60tn 
80th 
100th 
Failures 
494 
1,021 
1,478 
1,995 
2,478 
Downtime (min.) 
147,549 
249,951 
386,880 
464,709 
520,493 
Gini 
0.7598128 
0.730096 
0.7377354 
0.7131277 
0.7138073 
Atk (.99) 
0.6832824 
0.6446679 
0.6552135 
0.6286357 
0.6316302 
Atk (.20) 
0.2785598 
0.2780654 
0.2886511 
0.2632639 
0.2574603 
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Figure 3.59 Impact of Each Failure, System 20, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.60 Lorenz Curve, System 20, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.61 Failure Impact Histogram, System 20, LANL Data 
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Table 3.20 Inequality Coefficients, System 21, LANL Data 
System 
21 
21 
21 
21 
21 
Percentile 
20th 
40th 
60th 
80th 
100th 
Failures 
28 
44 
73 
96 
110 
Downtime (min.) 
4,122 
6,724 
9,985 
14,147 
15,807 
Gini 
0.5584494 
0.5513155 
0.526417 
0.5109527 
0.4956176 
Atk (.99) 
0.4520249 
0.4406514 
0.4201482 
0.3972765 
0.3767154 
Atk (.20) 
0.1100806 
0.1041251 
0.09500196 
0.0897491 
0.0845924 
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Figure 3.62 Impact of Each Failure, System 21, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.63 Lorenz Curve, System 21, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.64 Failure Impact Histogram, System 21, LANL Data 
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Table 3.21 Inequality Coefficients, System 22, LANL Data 
System 
22 
22 
22 
22 
22 
Percentile 
20th 
40th 
60m 
80th 
100th 
Failures 
52 
98 
162 
208 
246 
Downtime (min.) 
10,816 
17,558 
66,477 
78,659 
84,556 
Gini 
0.4742298 
0.413181 
0.7286914 
0.6937795 
0.6699327 
Atk (.99) 
0.3459984 
0.2724191 
0.6479295 
0.600729 
0.5698679 
Atk (.20) 
0.0911673 
0.06959792 
0.2960288 
0.2632218 
0.2503528 
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Figure 3.65 Impact of Each Failure, System 22, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.66 Lorenz Curve, System 22, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.67 Failure Impact Histogram, System 22, LANL Data 
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Table 3.22 Inequality Coefficients, System 23, LANL Data 
System 
23 
23 
23 
23 
23 
Percentile 
20th 
40th 
60th 
80th 
100th 
Failures 
114 
218 
343 
452 
564 
Downtime (min.) 
16,049 
32,484 
50,474 
70,531 
85,743 
Gini 
0.5291957 
0.589893 
0.5910107 
0.57899 
0.591682 
Atk (.99) 
0.4541011 
0.523773 
0.5233588 
0.5117965 
0.5148623 
Atk (.20) 
0.09828172 
0.1262523 
0.1288740 
0.1215052 
0.1284186 
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Figure 3.68 Impact of Each Failure, System 23, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.69 Lorenz Curve, System 23, LANL Data 
o 
CM 
O 
O -
O 
CO 
o 
ID 
a* to 
ID 
P4 
o 
o 
CM 
05 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 
log(DCa)) 
Figure 3.70 Failure Impact Histogram, System 23, LANL Data 
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Table 3.23 Inequality Coefficients, System 24, LANL Data 
System 
24 
24 
24 
24 
24 
Percentile 
20th 
40th 
60th 
80th 
100th 
Failures 
32 
59 
93 
126 
155 
Downtime (min.) 
6,658 
10,882 
45,331 
52,208 
58,177 
Gini 
0.4370119 
0.484666 
0.8146349 
0.786939 
0.7704078 
Atk (.99) 
0.2876526 
0.3301613 
0.7538131 
0.714698 
0.6930412 
Atk (.20) 
0.06265949 
0.07753442 
0.3706069 
0.3425476 
0.3240548 
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Figure 3.71 Impact of Each Failure, System 24, LANL Data 
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Figure 3.72 Lorenz Curve, System 24, LANL Data 
o 
O O 
g ^ 
u 
o 
CM 
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3 5 4.0 4.5 
log(D(xi)) 
Figure 3.73 Failure Impact Histogram, System 24, LANL Data 
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Table 3.24 Average Gini and Atkinson Coefficient per Percentile, LANL Data 
Percentile 
20th 
40th 
60th 
80th 
100th 
Avg Gini Coefficient 
0.68426383 
0.715950435 
0.748810878 
0.753712383 
0.762782465 
Avg Atk. (e = 0.20) 
0.21688 
0.246331 
0.285942 
0.28811 
0.29328 
Avg Atk. (e = 0.99) 
0.648644 
0.677153 
0.717554 
0.715567 
0.722912 
The following section concludes this chapter by drawing conclusions from these 
results and subsequently suggesting the introduction of the time-dependent failure index 
for HPC system volatility. 
3.6.3 Conclusions 
The average inequality coefficient per percentile results found in Table 3.24 show 
that as these systems age, they exhibit an increase in the level of inequality in the 
downtime caused by each incurred failure. That is, as HPC systems age, their failure 
activity becomes more volatile. 
Significance testing verified the legitimacy of this result. When testing the null 
hypothesis HQ that the resulting Gini coefficient averages represented the same value 
versus the alternate hypothesis Ha that the values significantly differed, a resulting p-
value of 0.01455 confirmed the alternate hypothesis at the 95% confidence level. A 
multiple R-squared value of 0.8967 further proved that the resulting Gini coefficient 
averages successfully model the behavior of the systems in the given percentiles. 
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When testing the null hypothesis H0 that the resulting Atkinson coefficient 
averages at parameter 0.20 represented the same value versus the alternate hypothesis Ha 
that the values significantly differed, a resulting p-value of 0.02465 confirmed the 
alternate hypothesis at the 95% confidence level. A multiple R-squared value of 0.8546 
further proved that the resulting Atkinson coefficient averages at parameter 0.20 
successfully model the behavior of the systems in the given percentiles. 
When testing the null hypothesis H0 that the resulting Atkinson coefficient 
averages at parameter 0.99 represented the same value versus the alternate hypothesis Ha 
that the values significantly differed, a resulting p-value of 0.02904 confirmed the 
alternate hypothesis at the 95% confidence level. A multiple R-squared value of 0.8384 
further proved that the resulting Atkinson coefficient averages at parameter 0.99 
successfully model the behavior of the systems in the given percentiles. 
This result suggests that system age significantly affects the volatility of the 
failure behavior exhibited by a given HPC system with regards to failures with both large 
and small impacts on downtime. The Atkinson coefficients confirm this result. There is 
clearly more inequality reported by the Atkinson (s = 0.99) result than the Atkinson (s = 
0.20) result 
Clearly, larger failures have a more significant effect on the level of equality 
contained in the dataset than smaller failures. For example, System 13 exhibits a single 
failure with an impact of 195195 minutes, or 5.648 days. This dwarfs the impact of all 
other failures encountered by the system and results in a 100th percentile Gini coefficient 
of 0.8384 and a 99th percentile Atkinson (e = 0.99) coefficient that was rounded to 1 via 
the software. However, the Atkinson (e = 0.20) coefficient, which lowered this and all 
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other values, was only 0.4596139. The resulting inequality coefficients for all systems 
were most affected by the largest failures, such as this one. 
To better represent the behavior of these and other systems, we suggest the 
derivation of a time-dependent inequality measure. The resulting equation - the Failure 
index (FI) - will generate coefficients that can then be used as a measure of HPC system 
volatility in time. It may be used in conjunction with existing metrics such as Mean Time 
Between Failure (MTBF) and the 'nines' measure of system reliability to better illustrate 
the failure activity of a given HPC system. The FI has roots in the Atkinson index and 
via the time-dependent generation of a scale- and location-invariant inequality coefficient 
it allows for a normalized representation of HPC system failure volatility in time. 
Whereas the Gini and Atkinson index coefficients in this chapter were calculated 
with respect to the impact of each failure located in the record, an FI coefficient is 
generated with respect to the cumulative downtime caused by all failures in a given time 
interval. As explained in the next chapter's introduction, the Failure Index is less affected 
by single large failures such as the one encountered by System 13. 
The following chapter gives a mathematical introduction of the FI. Chapter 5 
contains a case study in which FI coefficients are generated for the same LANL dataset 
used to formulate the results in this chapter. Those coefficients are then analyzed and 
compared with the information in this chapter to yield conclusions relative to the failure 
volatility of aging HPC systems. Those conclusions along with suggested future work are 
given in Chapter 6. 
CHAPTER 4 
A FAILURE INDEX FOR HPC APPLICATIONS 
4.1 The Failure Index 
The provision of resilient exascale HPC applications is a complicated and 
multifaceted effort requiring input from and coordination between computer scientists, 
mathematicians, application developers and pure scientists from various government 
laboratories, corporations and academic institutions. Presently there exist calls for such 
collaboration [95] and further there exists the suggestion of increased cross-entity 
standardization in the vocabulary, algorithms, and log file formats utilized in the larger 
HPC research and development community. To facilitate such standardization, the 
community must both re-examine existing metrics and their meaning in tomorrow's 
failure-rich computing environments and also develop new statistics appropriate to the 
study of HPC application resilience [96, 97]. 
This chapter formally introduces such a value - the Failure Index (or FI) - for 
HPC system volatility. The FI is introduced here from a mathematical standpoint. 
Importantly, in this chapter the FI is introduced at a high level and in relation to a 
continuous function wherein time acts as the independent variable. Our real-world FI 
coefficient generation and analysis in Chapter 5 will take place on discrete, rather than 
continuous data, requiring numerical integration techniques. Specifically, FI coefficients 
will be generated for the LANL system reliability dataset previously visited in Chapter 3. 
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A metric such as the FI was first suggested in our work detailing the generation 
of pertinent resilience-related application information found in Chapter 2. As shown in 
Chapter 3, the Gini and Atkinson inequality indices provide the suggested normalized 
view into an aspect of HPC application behavior. Specifically, such inequality indices 
generate coefficients relative to the level of inequality found in the individual failures 
incurred by an HPC system. Further, the scale- and location-invariant nature of these 
values allows for the comparison of multiple HPC systems regardless of size. 
Chapter 3 introduced those concepts and demonstrated their ability to capture this 
information. An analogous index is now present that, while similar in structure to the 
above, serves to capture the level of volatility in total system downtime relative to the 
age of a given HPC system. 
It is important to note the difference between the information captures by 
inequality metrics such as the Gini and Atkinson indices and the information captured by 
the Failure Index. Existing inequality indices are calculated with respect to discrete 
weighted events. The Failure Index is calculated with respect to cumulative time-
dependent data. That is, where the Gini or Atkinson indices capture the level of 
inequality in multiple individual failure events, the Failure Index captures the overall 
level of volatility exhibited by the system in time. 
The information captured by the FI was approximated in Chapter 3 via the 
calculation of Gini and Atkinson coefficients relative to various percentiles of a system's 
total lifespan. Using the FI, such percentiles are not needed, as its time-dependent nature 
allows the FI to examine the volatility in cumulative system downtime with respect to 
the age of the system. The Failure Index is mathematically defined as 
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F/e( F(7)) = 1 - ^ 1 _ 11 J F(ty~edt J (4.1) 
Here, F(t) represents the cumulative distribution function of system downtime 
resulting from failure, and F(T) represents the cumulative system downtime at a given 
time T. As the Failure Index is constructed as a time-dependent implementation of the 
Atkinson index, it also contains the parameter s, 0 < a < 1, that allows the Failure 
Index to place emphasis on various segments of a distribution, with parameters closer to 
(but not equal to) 1 generating FI coefficients giving greater weight to the larger 
elements of the distribution than parameters closer to 0. An FI coefficient, then, captures 
the level of volatility in total system downtime at time T using the given parameter, with 
higher levels of volatility yielding FI coefficients closer to 1 and lower levels of 
volatility yielding FI coefficients closer to 0. Equation (4.1) presents the novel 
mathematical contribution of this dissertation, and all resulting analysis in Chapter 5 is 
performed using this model. 
Using the terminology from the LANL dataset used in Chapters 3 and 5, existing 
inequality indices such as the Gini or Atkinson index generate coefficients which 
measure the level of inequality contained in the "downtime " column. The Failure Index, 
however, generates coefficients which measure the level of volatility in the "total 
downtime" column with respect to the "time" column. Figure 4.1 shows these three 
columns from System 6's reliability dataset, here represented in minutes. 
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Figure 4.1 "Time", "Downtime" and "Total Downtime" Columns, LANL Data 
In Chapter 5, Failure Index coefficients will be generated for all 23 systems 
contained in the LANL dataset. Like existing inequality indices such as the Gini and 
Atkinson index, the Failure Index produces scale- and location-invariant coefficients, 
allowing for the comparison of various machines regardless of size. 
FI coefficients are less sensitive to the volatility caused by a single abnormally 
strong or weak failure and more sensitive to stretches of volatile or non-volatile failure 
behavior in time. To illustrate this, consider the datasets given in Figure 4.2 and 4.3. 
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!time downtime totaldowntime 
120 
2400 
3500 
4800 
6000 
7200 
8400 
9600 
10SO0 
12000 
10 
10 
10 
400 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
20 
30 
430 
440 
450 
460 
470 
480 
430 
Figure 4.2 Sample Data 1, FI Coefficients vs. Atkinson Coefficients 
The above dataset generates an Atkinson index coefficient (e = 0.99) of 
0.7030416 for "down time". Clearly, a high level of inequality in "down time" exists 
due to a single failure causing a down time of 400 minutes. Likewise, the Failure Index 
coefficient (e = 0.99) for the above dataset is 0.8281679, which represents a substantial 
amount of failure volatility in the given time frame. 
The system depicted in Figure 4.2 runs for a total of 12000 minutes, or 200 hours. 
But what if the system ran for another 300 hours before encountering another 10 minute 
failure? That situation is represented in Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3 Sample Data 2, FI Coefficients vs. Atkinson Coefficients 
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The Atkinson index coefficient (s = 0.99) reduces slightly to a value of 
0.6905922, as more equality is introduced to the dataset when a tenth failure with an 
impact of 10 minutes is accounted for. However, the Failure Index coefficient (e = 0.99) 
substantially drops, to a value of 0.3925665. This is because the overall failure volatility 
of the system has substantially lowered due to the 300-hour non-failure period 
encountered by the system. Failure Index coefficients take such times into consideration. 
Standard inequality coefficients such as those generated by the Gini and Atkinson 
indices do not. 
The source code used to generate these coefficients via the R statistical software 
package is located in Appendix B. 
4.2 The GT Index 
In addition to FI coefficients, the analysis in Chapter 5 will also generate 
coefficients using the GT Index, first proposed by Kaminskiy et al in 2008 [98]. The GT 
is another modified version of the Atkinson index for use particularly in the evaluation of 
systems with repairable parts (for which an HPC application or system certainly qualifies 
- HPC system nodes can be replaced and HPC application processes can be rebooted). 
The GT index models the distribution in question as a Poisson process (PP) and 
measures that distribution's trend toward and away from a heterogeneous Poisson 
process (HPP) in time. 
In using the GT index the 0-to-l system utilized by the Failure Index is discarded 
in favor of a scheme containing values ranging from -1 to 1. An improving system, noted 
by values less than 0, denotes a system with a decreasing rate of occurrence of failure 
(ROCOF). Likewise, those values more than zero denote a. failing system (one with 
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increasing ROCOF). Values closer to 1 or -1 improve or fail more rapidly than values 
closer to 0. GT coefficients will allow us to examine changes in failure rate with respect 
to time, which when combined with FI coefficients will better describe the failure 
behavior of a given system. The GT index is defined as 
2 CN(t)dt 
GT(N(T)) = 1 - „ °
 A r^N • (4.2) 
Here, N (T) represents the number of failure events occurring in the given time 
interval [0,7]. This is an important difference between the GT and Failure indices. The 
GT is constructed in accordance to the number of events in a given time interval, 
whereas the FI is constructed with respect to the cumulative impact of those failures. The 
GT is associated with failure rates, and the FI is associated with failure volatility. The 
GT says nothing about the impact of a given failure. 
Recall that the GT index models the underlying distribution as a Poisson process. 
Here, an improving Poisson process is defined as one with decreasing ROCOF, while a 
deteriorating process has increasing ROCOF. A heterogeneous Poisson process has a 
constant ROCOF. Improving Poisson processes yield GT coefficients closer to -1, while 
deteriorating Poisson processes yield GT coefficients closer to 1. 
In Chapter 5, GT coefficients will be calculated for all time intervals for which FI 
coefficients are generated. The source code for generating GT coefficients via the R 
statistical software package can be found in Appendix C. 
CHAPTER 5 
USING THE FAILURE INDEX: A CASE STUDY 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we generate Failure Index coefficients for each of the 23 Los 
Alamos National Laboratory systems. A detailed description of this dataset can be found 
in the introduction to Chapter 3. 
In this analysis, FI coefficients are generated with parameters e = 0, e = 0.20 and 
e = 0.99. Further, a GT coefficient is generated for each system using Equation (4.2). The 
GT coefficient represents the system's rate of occurrence of failure (ROCOF) with 
respect to time. Increases in ROCOF generate positive GT coefficients. Likewise, 
decreases in ROCOF generate negative GT coefficients. Coefficients closer to 1 or -1 
contain higher increases or decreases in ROCOF than coefficients closer to 0. 
In addition, this analysis plots the total downtime exhibited by the system versus 
the age of the system. Much like a Lorenz curve, a perfectly non-volatile system would 
generate a 45-degree line on such a graph. Failure Index coefficients capture fluctuations 
toward and away from this line. 
Further, FI (e = 0) and GT coefficients are plotted in relation to the age of the 
system. This shows fluctuations in failure volatility and failure rate in time. 
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Long stretches of time without failure activity lower FI coefficients. Rapid and 
highly unequal failure activity increases FI coefficients. Section 4.1 reviews the 
information collected by the Failure Index relative to the information captured by 
inequality indices such as the Gini and Atkinson. 
The following section displays all results from this case study. Tables 5.1 through 
5.23 show the FI coefficients generated for each system using parameters 0, 0.20 and 
0.99, in addition to the GT coefficients generated by each system. Figures 5.1 through 
5.69 plot the total downtime exhibited by each system with respect to time, the FI 
coefficient efficient with respect to time and the GT coefficient with respect to time for 
each of the 23 systems. Tables 5.24 through 5.26 illustrate the number of LANL systems 
with increasing and decreasing ROCOF, the FI coefficient averages for those systems 
and the FI coefficient averages for all 23 systems. Section 5.3 will draw conclusions 
from these results. 
5.2 Results 
Table 5.1 FI Coefficients and ROCOF, System 2, LANL Data 
System 
2 
FI (s = 0) 
0.3488647 
FI (s = 0.20) 
0.3739617 
FI (e = 0.99) 
0.560606 
GT ( N(T) ) 
-0.2452266 
i 1 r 
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System Age (days) 
2500 3000 
Figure 5.1 Total Downtime vs. System Age, System 2, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.2 FI Coefficient vs. System Age, System 2, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.3 ROCOF vs. System Age, System 2, LANL Data 
Table 5.2 FI Coefficients and ROCOF, System 3, LANL Data 
System 
3 
FI (s = 0) 
0.4762693 
FI (s = 0.20) 
0.4928603 
FI (e = 0.99) 
0.6238533 
GT(N(T)) 
-0.1400224 
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Figure 5.4 Total Downtime vs. System Age, System 3, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.5 FI Coefficient vs. System Age, System 3, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.6 ROCOF vs. System Age, System 3, LANL Data 
Table 5.3 FI Coefficients and ROCOF, System 4, LANL Data 
System 
4 
FI (s = 0) 
0.5312802 
FI (s = 0.20) 
0.5510522 
FI (s = 0.99) 
0.6861621 
GT(N(T)) 
-0.1069729 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
CO 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
CD 
o -
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 
System Age (days) 
Figure 5.7 Total Downtime vs. System Age, System 4, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.8 FI Coefficient vs. System Age, System 4, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.9 ROCOF vs. System Age, System 4, LANL Data 
Table 5.4 FI Coefficients and ROCOF, System 5, LANL Data 
System 
5 
FI (s = 0) 
0.4517466 
FI (s = 0.20) 
0.4683794 
FI (s = 0.99) 
0.6250355 
GT(N(T)) 
-0.05701952 
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Figure 5.10 Total Downtime vs. System Age, System 5, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.11 FI Coefficient vs. System Age, System 5, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.12 ROCOF vs. System Age, System 5, LANL Data 
Table 5.5 FI Coefficients and ROCOF, System 6, LANL Data 
System 
6 
FI (s = 0) 
0.4661334 
FI (s = 0.20) 
0.4750499 
FI (e = 0.99) 
0.5761766 
GT(N(T)) 
-0.009286395 
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Figure 5.13 Total Downtime vs. System Age, System 6, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.14 FI Coefficient vs. System Age, System 6, LANL Data 
126 
o 
O 
O 
CM 
O 
O 
o 
0 200 400 600 
System Age (days) 
Figure 5.15 ROCOF vs. System Age, System 6, LANL Data 
Table 5.6 FI Coefficients and ROCOF, System 7, LANL Data 
System 
7 
FI (s = 0) 
0.5590928 
FI (s = 0.20) 
0.5754688 
FI (s = 0.99) 
0.6686179 
GT(N(T)) 
-0.2554706 
System Age (days) 
Figure 5.16 Total Downtime vs. System Age, System 7, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.17 FI Coefficient vs. System Age, System 7, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.18 ROCOF vs. System Age, System 7, LANL Data 
Table 5.7 FI Coefficients and ROCOF, System 8, LANL Data 
System 
8 
FI (s = 0) 
0.5743319 
FI (e = 0.20) 
0.5965732 
FI (s = 0.99) 
0.7276079 
GT ( N(T) ) 
0.1277645 
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Figure 5.19 Total Downtime vs. System Age, System 8, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.20 FI Coefficient vs. System Age, System 8, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.21 ROCOF vs. System Age, System 8, LANL Data 
Table 5.8 FI Coefficients and ROCOF, System 9, LANL Data 
System 
9 
FI (8 = 0) 
0.3801783 
FI (8 = 0.20) 
0.4195316 
FI (s = 0.99) 
0.7901992 
GT ( N(T) ) 
0.4110598 
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Figure 5.22 Total Downtime vs. System Age, System 9, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.23 FI Coefficient vs. System Age, System 9, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.24 ROCOF vs. System Age, System 9, LANL Data 
Table 5.9 FI Coefficients and ROCOF, System 10, LANL Data 
System 
10 
FI (s = 0) 
0.4393362 
FI (s = 0.20) 
0.4668898 
FI (s = 0.99) 
0.6757968 
GT ( N(T)) 
0.3073982 
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Figure 5.25 Total Downtime vs. System Age, System 10, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.26 FI Coefficient vs. System Age, System 10, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.27 ROCOF vs. System Age, System 10, LANL Data 
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Table 5.10 FI Coefficients and ROCOF, System 11, LANL Data 
System 
11 
FI (s = 0) 
0.3228945 
FI (s = 0.20) 
0.3503598 
FI (s = 0.99) 
0.6125574 
GT(N(T)) 
0.3016312 
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System Age (days) 
Figure 5.28 Total Downtime vs. System Age, System 11, LANL Data 
140 
o 
o 
o 
o o 
o 
o 
o 
oo 
oo o 
8 o o 
o ° 
1 1 
<o 
o 
°o 
9> 
1 
o 
1 1 1 1 
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 
System Age (days) 
Figure 5.29 FI Coefficient vs. System Age, System 11, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.30 ROCOF vs. System Age, System 11, LANL Data 
Table 5.11 FI Coefficients and ROCOF, System 12, LANL Data 
System 
12 
FI (s = 0) 
0.3989725 
FI (8 = 0.20) 
0.4317884 
FI (8 = 0.99) 
0.666791 
GT (N(T)) 
0.3937295 
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Figure 5.31 Total Downtime vs. System Age, System 12, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.32 FI Coefficient vs. System Age, System 12, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.33 ROCOF vs. System Age, System 12, LANL Data 
Table 5.12 FI Coefficients and ROCOF, System 13, LANL Data 
System 
13 
FI (e = 0) 
0.3546629 
FI (e = 0.20) 
0.3805183 
FI (s = 0.99) 
0.6209388 
GT (N(T) ) 
0.298536 
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Figure 5.34 Total Downtime vs. System Age, System 13, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.35 FI Coefficient vs. System Age, System 13, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.36 ROCOF vs. System Age, System 13, LANL Data 
Table 5.13 FI Coefficients and ROCOF, System 14, LANL Data 
System 
14 
FI (8 = 0) 
0.3113004 
FI (s = 0.20) 
0.3501405 
FI (s = 0.99) 
0.7133446 
GT(N(T)) 
0.1522754 
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Figure 5.37 Total Downtime vs. System Age, System 14, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.38 FI Coefficient vs. System Age, System 14, LANL Data 
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Table 5.14 FI Coefficients and ROCOF, System 15, LANL Data 
System 
15 
FI (s = 0) 
0.3203539 
FI (s = 0.20) 
0.3445422 
FI (s = 0.99) 
0.6678887 
GT (N(T)) 
-0.3574969 
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Figure 5.40 Total Downtime vs. System Age, System 15, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.41 FI Coefficient vs. System Age, System 15, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.42 ROCOF vs. System Age, System 15, LANL Data 
Table 5.15 FI Coefficients and ROCOF, System 16, LANL Data 
System 
16 
FI (s = 0) 
0.506235 
FI (s = 0.20) 
0.5470675 
FI (e = 0.99) 
0.7952932 
GT(N(T)) 
-0.1423502 
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Figure 5.43 Total Downtime vs. System Age, System 16, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.44 FI Coefficient vs. System Age, System 16, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.45 ROCOF vs. System Age, System 16, LANL Data 
Table 5.16 FI Coefficients and ROCOF, System 17, LANL Data 
System 
17 
FI (s = 0) 
0.4431006 
FI (s = 0.20) 
0.4693957 
FI (s = 0.99) 
0.6992799 
GT (N(T)) 
-0.1168528 
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Figure 5.46 Total Downtime vs. System Age, System 17, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.47 FI Coefficient vs. System Age, System 17, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.48 ROCOF vs. System Age, System 17, LANL Data 
Table 5.17 FI Coefficients and ROCOF, System 18, LANL Data 
System 
18 
FI (s = 0) 
0.4424562 
FI (s = 0.20) 
0.4581639 
FI (s = 0.99) 
0.5760466 
GT(N(T)) 
-0.01011574 
System Age (days) 
Figure 5.49 Total Downtime vs. System Age, System 18, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.50 FI Coefficient vs. System Age, System 18, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.51 ROCOF vs. System Age, System 18, LANL Data 
Table 5.18 FI Coefficients and ROCOF, System 19, LANL Data 
System 
19 
FI (s = 0) 
0.4978905 
FI (s = 0.20) 
0.5130915 
FI (e = 0.99) 
0.6412173 
GT (N(T)) 
-0.02191605 
System Age (days) 
Figure 5.52 Total Downtime vs. System Age, System 19, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.53 FI Coefficient vs. System Age, System 19, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.54 ROCOF vs. System Age, System 19, LANL Data 
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Table 5.19 FI Coefficients and ROCOF, System 20, LANL Data 
System 
20 
FI (s = 0) 
0.2358755 
FI (8 = 0.20) 
0.2441450 
FI (s = 0.99) 
0.3392873 
GT (N(T)) 
-0.3663878 
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Figure 5.55 Total Downtime vs. System Age, System 20, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.56 FI Coefficient vs. System Age, System 20, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.57 ROCOF vs. System Age, System 20, LANL Data 
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Table 5.20 FI Coefficients and ROCOF, System 21, LANL Data 
System 
21 
FI (s = 0) 
0.3521442 
FI (s = 0.20) 
0.3752301 
FI (s = 0.99) 
0.821141 
GT(N(T)) 
-0.2562533 
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Figure 5.58 Total Downtime vs. System Age, System 21, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.59 FI Coefficient vs. System Age, System 21, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.60 ROCOF vs. System Age, System 21, LANL Data 
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Table 5.21 FI Coefficients and ROCOF, System 22, LANL Data 
System 
22 
FI (e = 0) 
0.4140757 
FI (8 = 0.20) 
0.443951 
FI (s = 0.99) 
0.6050619 
GT ( N(T) ) 
-0.1168699 
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 
System Age (days) 
Figure 5.61 Total Downtime vs. System Age, System 22, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.62 FI Coefficient vs. System Age, System 22, LANL Data 
174 
O 
m 
ID 
o O 
H O 
o 
o 
i n 
O 
System Age (days) 
Figure 5.63 ROCOF vs. System Age, System 22, LANL Data 
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Table 5.22 FI Coefficients and ROCOF, System 23, LANL Data 
System 
23 
FI (s = 0) 
0.4729281 
FI (s = 0.20) 
0.4977982 
FI (s = 0.99) 
0.6634825 
GT(N(T)) 
-0.003102837 
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Figure 5.64 Total Downtime vs. System Age, System 23, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.65 FI Coefficient vs. System Age, System 23, LANL Data 
177 
O 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 
System Age (days) 
Figure 5.66 ROCOF vs. System Age, System 23, LANL Data 
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Table 5.23 FI Coefficients and ROCOF, System 24, LANL Data 
System 
24 
FI (8 = 0) 
0.3328124 
FI (e = 0.20) 
0.3583177 
FI (e = 0.99) 
0.514077 
GT ( N(T) ) 
-0.3460315 
System Age (days) 
Figure 5.67 Total Downtime vs. System Age, System 24, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.68 FI Coefficient vs. System Age, System 24, LANL Data 
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Figure 5.69 ROCOF vs. System Age, System 24, LANL Data 
Table 5.24 Number of Systems with Increasing vs. Decreasing ROCOF, LANL Data 
Increasing ROCOF 
16 
Decreasing ROCOF 
7 
Table 5.25 FI Coefficient Averages, Increasing vs. Decreasing ROCOF, LANL Data 
Systems With: 
Increasing ROCOF 
Decreasing ROCOF 
FI (s = 0) 
0.405614 
0.430932 
FI (e = 0.20) 
0.42934 
0.455128 
FI (e = 0.99) 
0.632599 
0.659323 
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Table 5.26 Coefficient Averages, All Systems, LANL Data 
Index 
Avg. 
FI (s = 0) 
0.418823 
FI (e = 0.20) 
0.442795 
FI (e = 0.99) 
0.646542 
GT(N(T)) 
0.052074 
5.3 Conclusions 
Sixteen of the 23 systems exhibit increasing ROCOF. Seven of the systems have 
decreasing ROCOF. However, increasing or decreasing ROCOF has little impact on the 
failure volatility of a given system, as systems with increasing ROCOF generated an FI 
(e = 0.99) coefficient of 0.632599 and systems with decreasing ROCOF generated an FI 
(e = 0.99) coefficient of 0.659323, values which are not significantly different. 
On average, the systems generated an FI (s = 0) coefficient of 0.418823, an FI (e 
= 0.20) coefficient of 0.442795 and an FI (e = 0.99) coefficient of 0.646542. Similar to 
the relationship reported in the inequality index results from Chapter 3, this suggests that 
the higher failure volatility exists amongst the larger failures incurred by a system, and 
less failure volatility exists amongst the smaller failures. 
Large periods of non-failure behavior significantly impact the failure volatility 
(and as such the resulting FI coefficient) of a given system. System 21, for example, 
contains a significant period of no failure activity toward the end of its lifetime, resulting 
in an FI (e = 0.99) coefficient of 0.821141. This was the highest FI coefficient reported 
by any system. Likewise, System 20, which contains the most regular time intervals 
between each failure, reported an FI (e = 0.99) coefficient of 0.3392873, the lowest of 
any system. 
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In conclusion, the amount of time between successive failures significantly 
contributes to the overall failure volatility exhibited by an HPC system. Such time 
periods are not accounted for using traditional inequality indices such as the Gini or 
Atkinson index. The FI, however, does capture these time periods, and results show that 
systems with more regular time intervals between system failures exhibit lower levels of 
volatility than those with prolonged periods of highly unequal time between successive 
failures. FI coefficients are less affected by single large failures than Gini or Atkinson 
coefficients, though the level of inequality in the impact of each failure exhibited by the 
system does still play a role in the volatility reported by a Failure Index coefficient. 
The relationship between system volatility as captured by FI coefficients and 
system failure rate as captured by GT coefficients can be seen in the plots of FI and GT 
coefficients in relation to time. A system's ROCOF levels as the system ages, while 
system volatility continues to fluctuate in the latter days of a system's lifespan. 
The following chapter closes the dissertation by drawing results from the entirety 
of the work and proposing future uses of the Failure Index. The source code used to 
generate the FI and GT coefficients reported in this chapter are given in Appendix B and 
Appendix C, respectively. A list of the acronyms used in this dissertation is given in 
Appendix A. 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
6.1 Conclusions 
In this dissertation we introduced and demonstrated a Failure Index for High 
Performance Computing applications. The FI is a time-dependent implementation of the 
Atkinson Index and captures the failure volatility exhibited by an HPC system in a given 
period. It is less affected by single large failures and more affected by fluctuations in 
failure strength over time and irregular time intervals between successive failures. 
Existing inequality indices such as the Gini and Atkinson index do not take time into 
consideration. System failure rates level as HPC system's age, while system volatility 
does not. 
Background information was given in the first two chapters in order to 
demonstrate the need for such a metric, including a general introduction to HPC 
resilience, a look at previous work in statistically analyzing large HPC datasets, and a 
means to generate application-specific data from a large-scale HPC application. 
Inequality indices were then introduced from a statistical standpoint and their 
applicability was demonstrated via application to a dataset containing failure information 
from 23 machines housed at Los Alamos National Laboratory from 1996 to 2005. 
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The FI was then mathematically introduced in Chapter 4, along with an overview 
of the GT Index, which captures a system's rate of occurrence of failure (ROCOF). In 
Chapter 5, the FI and GT Indices were applied to the LANL dataset, with results showing 
time plays an important role in the failure volatility exhibited by a given system. Results 
also show that a system's ROCOF and its level of failure volatility are not statistically 
related. 
6.2 Future Work 
Suggested future work in this area consists largely of implementing the Failure 
Index in real time on an existing suitably-scaled HPC system. Specifically, it is 
suggested that an FI module be created for the SLURM platform, which in its current 
form is much like the proposed Resilience Framework mentioned in the first chapter of 
this dissertation. 
This effort would require a large dedication to both application programming and 
tuning as well as interface development. However, the utility of a real time FI is clear -
one would be able to react to changes in application failure volatility in accordance with 
real time fluctuations of a system's FI coefficient, which when combined with existing 
metrics such as MTBF and the 'nines' system reliability allows for greater flexibility in 
how to proactively prepare for the failure behavior exhibited by a given system. 
Future work also includes combining the FI with the real-time application metric 
generation software Gilgamesh, developed by the author and discussed in Chapter 2. 
This would allow for the generation of live per-application FI coefficients immediately 
after the extraction of relevant failure-related data from that application. This would 
allow for the real time monitoring of an application's failure volatility. 
APPENDIX A 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
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ASCI - Advanced Scientific Computing Initiative 
BG/L - Blue/Gene L 
BLCR - Berkeley Laboratory Checkpoint/Restart 
Blobs - Binary Large OBjectS 
C/R - Checkpoint/Restart 
CIF - Cumulative Intensity Function 
CLI - Command Line Interface 
CMU - Carnegie Melon University 
CPU - Central Processing Unit 
CTD - Collection of Training Data 
DOE - Department of Energy 
FC() - Failure Classification Function 
FENCE - Fault-Aware ENabled Computing Environment 
FI - Failure Index 
FLOPS - Floating Point Operations Per Second 
FPM - Failure Probability Model 
GUI - Graphical User Interface 
HPC - High Performance Computing 
K-S - Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
LAM - Local Area Multicomputer MPI 
LANL - Los Alamos National Laboratory 
LLNL - Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
MPI - Message Passing Interface 
MTBF - Mean Time Between Failure 
MTTF - Mean Time To Failure 
MTTR - Mean Time To Repair 
OSS - Open|SpeedShop 
ROCOF - Rate of Occurrence of Failure 
RRE - Resilience-Related Event 
SEP - Similar Event Prediction 
SGI - Silicon Graphics, Inc. 
TTF - Time To Failure 
TTR - Time To Repair 
APPENDIX B 
FAILURE INDEX SOURCE CODE 
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#FISCRIPT.R -- Computes a time-dependent Failure Index coefficient for 
the given dataset 
#AUTHOR: Clayton Chandler, Louisiana Tech University 
#load the necessary libraries 
library(caTools) 
#NOTE: dataset must be ran before running script. 
#NOTE: parameter must be set before running script. 
#set the necessary values, assuming data has already been loaded 
idx = 2:length(data$time) 
T <- as.double(data$time[idx][(length(data$time)-1)]) 
FT <- as.double(data$totaldowntime[idx][(length(data$downtime)-1)]) 
#get the mean values for both time and downtime 
EFT <- as.double(mean(data$totaldowntime)) 
ET <- as.double(mean(data$time)) 
tfind the integral using the trapezoid rule and the given parameter 
INTEGRAL <- as.double( (data$time[idx] - data$time[idx-1]) %*% 
( (data$totaldowntime[idx]A(1-parameter)) + (data$totaldowntime[ldx-
1]A(1-parameter))) / 2) 
#Multiply the integral by (1 / T) 
INSIDEPRODUCT <- as.double(INTEGRAL * (1/T)) 
tObtam the Inside Product to the (1 / 1-parameter) power 
POWER <- as.double(INSIDEPRODUCT A as.double(1/(1-parameter)) ) 
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#Multiply the result by 1/E(T) 
OUTSIDEPRODUCT <- as.double(POWER * as.double(1/FT) ) 
#Take one minus this to get final result 
FI <- as.double(1 - OUTSIDEPRODUCT) 
tReturn the resulting FI coefficient 
return (as.double(FI)) 
APPENDIX C 
GT INDEX SOURCE CODE 
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#GTSCRIPT.R — Computes a GT Index coefficient for the given dataset 
#AUTHOR: Clayton Chandler, Louisiana Tech University 
#load the necessary libraries 
library(caTools) 
#NOTE: dataset must be ran before running script. 
#NOTE: parameter must be set before running script. 
#set the necessary values, assuming data has already been loaded 
idx = 2:length(data$quantile) 
T <- as.double(data$quantile[idx][(length(data$quantile)-1)]) 
N <- as.double(data$numberofevents[idx][(length(data$numberofevents)-
1)]) 
#find the integral using the trapezoid rule and the given parameter 
GTINTEGRAL <- as.doublet (data$quantile[idx] - data$quantile[idx-1]) 
%*% (data$numberofevents[idx] + data$numberofevents[idx-1]) / 2) 
#Obtain the numerator 
GTNUMERATOR <- as.double(GTINTEGRAL * 2) 
#Obtain the denomenator 
GTDENOMENATOR <- as.double(T * N) 
#Get the fraction 
GTFRACTION <- as.double(GTNUMERATOR / GTDENOMENATOR) 
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#Get the coefficient 
GT <- as.double(1 - GTFRACTION) 
#Return the resulting GT coefficient 
return (as.double(GT)) 
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